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I. INTRODUCTION
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Article
36) provides that individuals detained in a foreign country must be noti-
fied of their "right" to seek assistance of consul from their country of
origin.' For the last decade, courts in the United States have struggled to
determine how Article 36 should affect the criminal charges against for-
eign nationals in the United States.2 Courts have been unable to reach
consensus on whether Article 36 creates rights individuals can enforce in
criminal proceedings, and if so, what remedies are available for viola-
tions of those rights . Two opinions of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) interpreting Article 364 have exacerbated this confusion, while the
U.S. Supreme Court, until recently, has remained hesitant to rule on the
substantive issues surrounding Article 36.'
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson,6 the Supreme
Court finally broke its silence. However, its ruling leaves the intema-
tional community with more questions than answers about the future of
Article 36 litigation in the United States. Rather than establishing defini-
tive standards for Article 36 relief, the Sanchez-Llamas decision suggests
relief from Article 36 violations will be accorded on a case-by-case ba-
sis, and may not be equally available to all defendants.
The controversy over Article 36 stems largely from the provision's
diplomatic origins. Article 36 was not drafted with an eye towards do-
mestic criminal litigation, but rather as part of the larger Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). The VCCR was primarily
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
2. See Sara M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S.
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1738-
40 (2003).
3. Id.
4. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
5. The Supreme Court thrice before granted writs of certiorari related to Article 36 in
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (holding that Article 36 claims do not
trump federal procedural default rules); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059
(1997) (holding amendments to habeas corpus statute by the AEDPA did not apply to this
noncapital case); and Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (previously
granted writ of certiorari as to Article 36 issues deemed improvidently granted).
6. The two cases were joined and a joint opinion was issued on them due to similar
issues and subject matter. The opinions of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson
were issued under Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
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intended to "contribute to the development of friendly relations among
nations .... "7 However, Article 36 specifically addressed the disadvan-
tages faced by foreign nationals detained in "legal system[s] whose
institutions and rules were unfamiliar."8 "Article 36 serves as a safeguard
to ensure that foreign nationals have the support of individuals who can
orient them to the bewildering array of rules that govern the United
States criminal justice system."9
When foreign nationals are detained in the United States, language,
culture, and separation from family create "an aura of chaos surrounding
[their detention] . . . . "' Detained foreign nationals are inevitably dis-
tressed by the prospect of securing and preserving their rights in an alien
legal system." They are often uniquely vulnerable to fear and manipula-
tion by authorities,' 2 and "language and cultural barriers"1
3 may hinder
their understanding or exercise of fundamental rights.'
4 For example, a
foreign national could sign a waiver of a fundamental right or a confes-
sion while under a misapprehension about the document's 
contents. 5
Whereas most American citizens possess basic knowledge of their
fundamental constitutional rights, foreign nationals are likely to experi-
ence difficulty understanding complex legal concepts like the right to
counsel, or the right to remain silent, if no similar rights exist in their
home country. In inquisitorial systems, for example, "negative inferences
can be drawn from any attempt to remain silent in the face of official
questioning about a crime." 6 For foreign nationals accustomed to such
systems, Miranda warnings alone may be insufficient to explain the
American right against self-incrimination. The right to counsel in the
7. VCCR, supra note 1, Preamble.
8. LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 145 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting U.S.
Dep't of State, Telegram 40298 to Embassy Damascus, Feb. 21, 1975).
9. Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and the Law
Council of Australia (LCA) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas
at 14-15, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL
3543085 [hereinafter Brief of the NACDL].
10. Linda A. Malone, From Breard to Atkins to Malvo: Legal Incompetency and Hu-
man Rights Norms on the Fringes of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 363,
392-93 (2004).
11. LEE, supra note 8, at 145.
12. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 9, at 8.
13. "Language barriers" are impediments to communication that occur when a detained
foreign national does not speak the same language as detaining authorities. "Cultural barriers"
refer to difficulties in understanding cultural institutions that result from a detained foreign
national's experiences in her country of origin.
14. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 605 (1997).
15. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 9, at 8.
16. Id. at 13. See also Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and
Moves Toward an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 410-11
(1994).
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United States may be similarly incomprehensible to foreign nationals
who may presume that a public defender appointed by the state will rep-
resent the state.'7 Also, some foreign nationals come from countries
where physical abuse by authorities is commonplace. This fear can lead
to false confessions and prevent the exercise of fundamental rights.'8
Consular assistance, when available, can mitigate the harm caused
by language and cultural barriers and place detained foreign nationals on
equal footing with detained citizens. Such assistance can be a "cultural
bridge," which allows foreign nationals to "navigate the waters of the
criminal justice system and ... help[s] them secure their rights within
that system."' 9 Consular officials can explain substantive and procedural
rights in the American system in a way that foreign nationals will under-
stand. In addition, many consulates provide translators and contact
information for lawyers. Others will retain counsel, locate evidence and
witnesses in the home country, or intervene in court proceedings or
through appellate filings. 0 For detained foreign nationals, "consular as-
sistance often determines whether they obtain the fundamental rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants."2'
Article 36(1) of the VCCR sets forth three "rights" aimed at ensuring
consular assistance: 1) detained foreign nationals are entitled to "free-
dom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers
of the sending State;"22 2) "[a]ny communication addressed to the consu-
lar post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay;"23 and 3) "[c]onsular
officers shall have the right to visit a national of a sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and
,24to arrange for his legal representation." In addition, Article 36(1) pro-
vides that detaining authorities must notify foreign nationals "without
delay of [their Article 36(1)] rights . . . ,,2 This latter requirement is the
basis for most Article 36 litigation in the United States-foreign nation-
17. Indeed, even domestic defendants have made such claims. See Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981).
18. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 2974437.
19. Brief for Amici Curiae Republic of Honduras and Other Foreign Sovereigns in
Support of Petitioners at 8, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (No. 04-10566, 05-
51), 2005 WL 3597807.
20. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in
Support of Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3543087.
21. Kadish, supra note 14, at 605.
22. VCCR, supra note 1, art 36(1)(a).
23. Id. art. 36(1)(b).
24. Id. art 36(1)(c).
25. Id. art 36(l)(b).
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als have claimed that the failure by authorities to notify them of their
Article 36 "individual rights" entitles them to judicial remedies in U.S.
criminal proceedings. This is the core issue the Supreme Court ad-
dressed in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.
The reference to foreign nationals' "rights" in Article 36(1) is incon-
sistent with the VCCR Preamble, which states that the VCCR was "not
[intended] to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance
of the functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States. 26
Such consular functions include "protecting in the receiving State the
interests of the sending State and of its nationals [and] ... helping and
assisting nationals.., of the sending State."27
Even if Article 36(1) creates individual rights, the VCCR clearly
does not provide specific remedies for violations. Rather, Article 36(2)
provides that
the rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article [36]
are intended.28
U.S. courts have been at odds with the ICJ over the proper interpre-
tation of Article 36(2). In the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Avena),29 the ICJ addressed a complaint filed by
Mexico alleging Article 36 violations by the United States. When Mex-
ico filed the application instituting proceedings, the ICJ had jurisdiction
to bind the United States under the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). The
Optional Protocol, which the United States ratified as a companion
agreement to the VCCR, ° gave the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over dis-
putes arising out of the VCCR.3" The United States argued in Avena that
Article 36 should be enforced through political and diplomatic channels,
26. VCCR, supra note 1, Preamble.
27. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2691 (2006) (citing VCCR, supra note
1, arts. 5(a), 5(e)).
28. VCCR, supra note 1, art 36(2).
29. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31).
30. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2675.
31. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, April
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S 487.
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rather than through the courts,32 and that such enforcement would give
"full effect" to the rights as required by Article 36(2). The ICJ rejected
this argument and held that the "full effect" provision in Article 36(2)
required that courts attach "legal significance" to the violation of Article
36 in a judicial proceeding. 3  After the Avena ruling, the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol, leaving U.S. courts to determine
how to enforce Article 36.
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide:
(1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grant[ed] rights
which may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding;
(2) whether suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a
violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may
be deemed forfeited under state procedural rules because a de-
fendant failed to raise the claim at trial.34
The first two issues were raised in State v. Sanchez-Llamas," where the
defendant made incriminating statements without being informed of his
right to contact the Mexican Consulate. The trial court denied his Article
36 motion to suppress the statements, and the Supreme Court of Oregon
upheld the denial, finding Article 36 does not create individually en-
forceable rights.36 The third issue arose in Bustillo v. Johnson,37 after the
defendant, a Honduran national, alleged for the first time in his state ha-
beas corpus petition that an Article 36 violation deprived him of
evidence crucial to his defense. The state habeas court dismissed the Ar-
ticle 36 claim,38 and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied his appeal.
The two cases, both arising under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, were joined and a joint opinion was issued due to
similar issues and subject matter.
In the resulting decision, a five-Justice majority-Justice Roberts
writing, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, with Jus-
tice Ginsberg concurring in the judgment-held that "even assuming
[Article 36] creates judicially enforceable rights ... suppression is not
an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36.""9 Further, it held "a
32. See Verbatim Record: Public Sitting Held Jan. 21, 2003, 6:00 p.m., Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (argument of William H. Taft IV), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuscr/imusicr2003-04_20030121 .PDF.
33. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 113.
34. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006).
35. 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005).
36. Id. at 575-76.
37. 63 Va. Cir. 125 (2003).
38. See Bustillo v. Johnson, 65 Va. Cir. 69 (2004).
39. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2674.
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State may apply its regular rules of procedural default to Article 36
claims.' ' °
The majority did not adopt the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36(2).
Rather, it held that because Article 36(2) provides that Article 36 rights
are to "be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State," "legal significance" could be attached to Article 36 vio-
lations only under a relevant provision of domestic law.' Where the ICJ
looked first to Article 36(2) and determined that legal significance must
be attached to every Article 36 violation, the Sanchez-Llamas majority
looked first to domestic law to determine whether legal significance
would attach to any given violation. Under the majority's interpretation,
the "full effect" requirement is satisfied so long as domestic law provides
an avenue of relief for some violations and does not render Article 36
completely inoperative. Although the Sanchez-Llamas majority does not
foreclose all relief for Article 36 violations, the availability of relief in
the future apparently will be limited and likely will be contingent on a
foreign national's ability to support claims for which judicial remedies
are already available under domestic law.
Justice Breyer's dissent-joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, with
Justice Ginsberg joining on the question of individual rights under Arti-
cle 36-adopted the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36(2) and argued that
"full effect" meant that domestic laws and regulations were required to
attach legal significance to all Article 36 violations.4 '2 The Sanchez-
Llamas majority, however, expressly provided three means of vindicat-
ing Article 36 rights: first, for defendants raising Article 36 claims at
trial, "a court can make appropriate accommodations to ensure the de-
fendant secures, to the extent possible, the benefits of consular
assistance.' " 3 Second, "[d]iplomatic avenues-the primary means of en-
forcing the [VCCR]-also remain open."" Third, "[a] defendant can
raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntari-
ness of his statements to police."4' 5
This Article analyzes the Sanchez-Llamas decision and attempts to
ascertain its impact on future Article 36 litigation. Part II specifically
discusses the implications of Sanchez-Llamas on previous interpretations
of Article 36 by domestic and international tribunals. Part III undertakes
an analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part IV ex-
amines the means of vindicating Article 36 rights provided by the
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2688.
42. Id. at 2702.
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Sanchez-Llamas majority, and considers which remedies will be avail-
able for future Article 36 violations.
II. DECISIONS PRIOR TO SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V OREGON
The majority decision in Sanchez-Llamas includes several holdings
at odds with international precedents and ensures that the positions of
the United States and the international community with regard to Article
36 will remain adversarial. The majority avoided deciding whether Arti-
cle 36 creates individual rights, finding instead that there were no
adequate domestic remedies, and hence, no need to reach the question of
individual rights. It also decided that states may apply their regular pro-
cedural default rules to Article 36 claims. Each of these holdings places
U.S. law at odds with the decisions of other courts.
A. International Opinions
Unlike the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas, international tribunals
have interpreted Article 36 as providing an individual right which, if vio-
lated, requires remediation. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
issued an Advisory Opinion sought by Mexico against the United States
in 1999, finding that Article 36 created individual rights, and that the
United States violated those rights, prejudicing the due process rights of
certain Mexican nationals under Article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).46 It also found that foreign na-
tionals subject to such violations are entitled to "reparations. 47
Sanchez-Llamas is especially antagonistic to the ICJ, which has is-
sued two substantive rulings on Article 36 violations by the United
States since the Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court con-
demned the conduct of the United States. In the LaGrand Case,48 six
years before the Supreme Court decided Sanchez-Llamas, the ICJ found
that application of procedural default rules to some Article 36 claims
violated Article 36(2). The ICJ found that Article 36(1) creates individ-
ual rights to consular notification and access to consulates that are
enforceable by individual defendants.4'9 Giving "full effect" to these
rights would require that a court attach legal significance to the violation
46. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guaran-
tees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
16, [121-24 (Oct. 1, 1999).
47. Id. 137.
48. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
49. ld.9[ 77.
1192 [Vol. 27:1l185
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Article 36
of Article 36. ° Under the ICJ's interpretation, procedural default rules
violate Article 36(2) if 1) authorities did not comply with Article 36(1)
notification provisions, and 2) the default "does not allow the detained
individual to challenge a conviction and sentence [based on an Article 36
violation]."" The appropriate remedy in such cases is "review and recon-
sideration" of the procedurally defaulted claim. 2
In Avena, the ICJ clarified its position on procedural default, holding
that "review and reconsideration" must occur in a judicial proceeding
that attaches "legal significance" to the violation of Article 36 . By hold-
ing that "a State may apply its regular rules of procedural default to
Article 36 claims,"' the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas disregarded
the ICJ's interpretation of both Article 36 and the issue of procedural
default.
The Avena judgment did not establish a specific remedy for Article
36 violations, 55 leaving the question open to "examin[ation] under the
1056concrete circumstances of each case by the United States courts ....
The ICJ found that the Article 36(1) provision for notification "without
delay" requires notification "once it is realized. that the person is a for-
eign national ... "' and not immediately upon arrest. This analysis
lends support to the Supreme Court's determination that suppression of
statements to police is not an appropriate remedy for Article 36 viola-
tions." However, the ICJ found that some remedy was required if an
Article 36 violation "in the causal sequence of events, ultimately led to
convictions and severe penalties . . . ,59 Under the interpretation of Arti-
cle 36(2) adopted by the Sanchez-Llamas majority, relief is not available
for every Article 36 violation, even if the violation "ultimately led to [a]
conviction[] ... ."6 Thus, the majority also disregarded the ICJ's inter-
pretation of Article 36 with regard to remedies.
U.S. courts have gained notoriety in the international community for
their continuing defiance of rulings by international tribunals that have
concluded that Article 36 conveys an individual enforceable right for
50. Id. 196.
51. Id. 90.
52. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12,1 121 (Mar. 31).
53. Id. 133.
54. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2674 (2006).
55. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, [ 120-22.
56. Id. 1 127.
57. Id. 163.
58. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697.
59. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12, 1 122.
60. Id.
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detained foreign nationals.6' In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court
validated this defiance.
B. Domestic Opinions
Sanchez-Llamas is generally consistent with domestic Article 36 ju-
risprudence and will not overrule any circuit court decisions addressing
Article 36. It does, however, raise questions about the validity of some
aspects of previous decisions, and it endorses limited remediation.
Before Sanchez-Llamas, the Federal Circuit Courts were split on the
question of whether Article 36 created individual rights. Like the San-
chez-Llamas majority, the First,62 Fourth,63 Eighth, 64 Ninth,6 Tenth,66 and
Eleventh67 Circuit Courts of Appeals declined to decide this question and
rejected Article 36 claims on other grounds. The Fifth68 and Sixth69 Cir-
cuits found that Article 36 did not create individual rights, but the
Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Article 36
created an individually enforceable right that can serve as the basis for a
private civil action.0
The Circuit Courts were more unified in their treatment of suppres-
sion as a remedy for Article 36 violations. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas, the
First,7' Fifth,72 Sixth,73 Seventh,
74 Eighth75, Ninth,7 6 Tenth,
77 and Eleventh 78
Circuits held that suppression is not an appropriate remedy. The majority
of state courts have also held that Article 36 violations cannot be reme-
died through suppression of evidence. 79 Sanchez-Llamas expressly
61. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
The International Court of Justice in Mexico v. United States (Avena) Speaks Emphatically to
the Supreme Court of the United States About the Fundamental Nature of the Right to Consul,
36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
62. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Zhang, 217 F.3d 843 (Table) (4th Cir. 2000).
64. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F3d 873 (8th Cir. 2002).
65. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. United States v. Contreras-Cortez, 41 F. App'x 252 (10th Cir. 2002).
67. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2002).
68. See United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001).
69. See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cit. 2001).
70. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 382 (7th Cir. 2005).
71. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
72. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199.
73. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 391.
74. United States v. Chaparrao-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2000).
75. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 888 (8th Cir. 2002).
76. Unites States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000).
77. United States v. Contreras-Cortez, 41 F. App'x 252 (10th Cir. 2002).
78. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2002).
79. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 387 N.J. Super. 81 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); People v.
Salgado, 852 N.E.2d 266 (I11. App. Ct. 2006); Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
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upholds these decisions, and strongly supports other opinions denying
judicial remedies for Article 36 violations. For example, the Courts of
Appeals for the First,80 Second,' Sixth, 2 and Eleventh83 Circuits have
held that dismissal of the indictment is also not an appropriate remedy
for Article 36 violations, and these holdings are consistent with Sanchez-
Llamas.
Sanchez-Llamas does, however, raise questions about the Fourth
Circuit's holding in United States v. Beckford. In Beckford, the defendant
alleged an Article 36 violation based on the trial court's refusal to grant a
continuance after the defendant learned of his Article 36 rights at trial.4
Although the Fourth Circuit denied relief without addressing whether the
trial court erred by denying the continuance, the trial court's decision
was likely erroneous under Sanchez-Llamas. The Sanchez-Llamas ma-
jority expressly provided that a trial court should "make appropriate
accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent pos-
sible, the benefits of consular assistance."85 In the future, refusals by trial
courts to make such accommodations should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Beckford may have failed to cor-
rect an error by the trial court.
Sanchez-Llamas also raises questions about the analyses applied by
some courts in rejecting Article 36 claims. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas, the
Fourth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that suppression and other
remedies were available for Article 36 violations, but it rejected Article
36 claims based on the failure to show prejudice from any alleged viola-
tion. 6 The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cazares,s7 and the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera,88 also applied the preju-
dice analysis in rejecting Article 36 claims. Although Sanchez-Llamas
does not specifically overrule the ultimate holdings in these cases, its
determination that suppression is never an appropriate remedy for an
Article 36 violation will compel all courts to reject future suppression
cases based on Article 36 claims without resorting to a prejudice analy-
sis.
80. See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
81. United States v. De la Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001).
82. See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001).
83. See Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d at 1277.
84. No. 97-4926, 2000 WL 376155, at * 13 (4th Cir. May 3, 2000).
85. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
86. See, e.g., U.S. v. Zhang, 217 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
87. 60 F App'x 223 (10th Cir. 2003).
88. 212 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2000).
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III. SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V OREGON AND BUST1LLO V JOHNSON
MAJORITY AND DISSENT
The holding in Sanchez-Llamas, while silent about whether Article
36 creates individual rights, suggests that an affirmative answer to this
question may be forthcoming if the Court finds it necessary to address it
in the future. The decision also has serious implications for both sup-
pression of detainees' statements made without the protections Article 36
affords and the question of procedural default. This section analyzes the
Court's decision and Justice Breyer's dissent on each of these subjects.
A. Individual Rights
Success on any Article 36 claim is contingent on a finding that Arti-
cle 36 creates individual rights. The Sanchez-Llamas majority declined
to decide whether Article 36 creates individual rights, concluding instead
that the petitioners were "not in any event entitled to relief on their
claims." 9 Although Sanchez-Llamas did not expressly hold that Article
36 creates individual rights, certain aspects of the decision suggest that
such a right exists.
Some support for the view that the Court would find such rights can
be derived from dicta in Breard v. Greene.9° Confusion about whether
Article 36 creates an individual right of enforcement stems largely from
the "obvious tension between the broad language of the clause in the
[VCCR] Preamble that appears to disclaim any general intent to protect
individuals, and the language of Article 36,"9' which refers to the "rights"
of foreign nationals. Although the Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled on these arguments, the Court stated in Breard that Article 36 "ar-
guably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance .... 92
Further support for the proposition that the Court may one day de-
cide that Article 36 creates individual rights can be gleaned from
considering Sanchez-Llamas in conjunction with the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,93 issued only one day after San-
chez-Llamas. Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter
formed the majority in Hamdan, declining to decide whether Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) "[furnishes
the] petitioner with any enforceable right."94 Unlike Article 36, Common
Article 3 does not expressly refer to the "rights" of individuals in deten-
89. 126 S. Ct. at 2678.
90. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
91. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 375 (7th Cir. 2005).
92. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
93. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
94. Id. at 2794.
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tion, but rather provides that the parties to an "armed conflict not of an
international character ... [are] prohibited at any time and in any place
... [from] the passing of sentences ... without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court . . . ,9' Nonetheless, it is likely
that the five members of the Hamdan majority favor finding individual
rights under Common Article 3.
Dissenting in Hamdan, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito found that
Common Article 3 does not create individual rights, based on a footnote
from the Supreme Court's 1950 ruling in Johnson v. Eisentrager.9 The
footnote stated that "responsibility for observance and enforcement of
[rights under the 1929 Geneva Convention] is upon political and military
authorities."97 Based on this footnote, the dissent found that "diplomatic
measures by political and military authorities [are] the exclusive mecha-
nisms" of enforcing the protections in Common Article 3.98 The dissent
used the same reasoning that the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, joined at the time by current Chief Justice Roberts, applied in
its earlier ruling in Hamdan. That court found that Common Article 3
does not create individual rights, relying on the aforementioned footnote
in Eisentrager" and the general presumption that "'[i]nternational agree-
ments ... do not create private rights.., in domestic courts.' ",0
The Hamdan majority criticized the Court of Appeals for relying
only on a statement "[b]uried in a footnote of the [Eisentrager] opinion
... ,,oI The majority referred to the Eisentrager footnote as "this curious
statement suggesting that the Court lacked power even to consider the
merits of the Geneva Convention argument .... ."2 This strongly sug-
gests that the Hamdan majority, unlike the dissent, does not consider
Eisentrager a barrier to finding that Common Article 3 creates individual
rights. The majority ultimately avoided this issue, finding that
[w]hatever else might be said about the Eisentrager footnote, it
does not control this case. We may assume that ... [the Geneva
Conventions do not furnish the] petitioner with any enforceable
95. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
96. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2844-45 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950)).
98. Id. at 2844.
99. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
100. Id. at 39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)).
101. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct at 2794 (majority opinion).
102. Id.
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right. For, regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on
Hamdan ... they are... part of the law of war.' 3
The majority footnoted this statement with several arguments favoring
"the existence of 'rights' conferred in prisoners of war [by Common Ar-
ticle 3],"''° and it did not cite any sources arguing the contrary position.
In sum, the Hamdan majority's discussion of individual rights strongly
implies that it favors finding individual rights under Common Article 3.
Because VCCR Article 36 expressly refers to "rights" of detained
foreign nationals, the case for finding individual rights under Article 36
is even stronger than the case for finding individual rights under Com-
mon Article 3. Thus, it is likely that the members of the Hamdan
majority would favor finding that Article 36, like Common Article 3,
creates individual rights. Indeed, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens have already expressed their support for finding such rights in
the Sanchez-Llamas dissent. This makes Justice Kennedy the only mem-
ber of the Hamdan majority that has not already found that Article 36
creates individual rights.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Hamdan may explain his
reluctance to reach the individual rights question in Sanchez-Llamas. In
his Hamdan concurrence, Justice Kennedy cited Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino for the proposition that "[t]here should be reluctance
... to reach unnecessarily"'' 5 questions of treaty interpretation, where
"Congress may choose to provide further guidance in this area."' 6 In
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court recognized that judicial pronouncements
on international law should reflect a "proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government.... [T]he
greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular
area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it... ,,07 However, with regard to issues of
international law that touch "more sharply on national nerves"' courts
should avoid the "sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsis-
tent with the national interest or with international justice."'' 9 Finding
that a treaty creates individual rights, when such a finding is unnecessary
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2794 n.57 (quoting Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, 3 Commentary: Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 91 (1960)); see also id. at 2794 n.58
(quoting Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, 1 Commentary: Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 84 (1952)).
105. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct at 2809, (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
107. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
108. Id. at 428.
109. Id.
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to the ultimate holding, would be contrary to the principle announced in
Sabbatino.
The question of whether Article 36 creates individual rights certainly
qualifies as an issue that touches "sharply on national nerves." In the cur-
rent political climate-and given the principle announced in
Sabbatino-any finding of an individual right under Article 36 should be
delayed until it becomes necessary to the ultimate result in a case. This
would occur only if a claimant was otherwise entitled to relief on his
Article 36 claim-for example, if a defendant successfully "raise[d] an
Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his
statements to police."" Justice Breyer, writing for the Sanchez-Llamas
dissent, implicitly acknowledged the Sabbatino principle at the outset of
his individual rights argument, stating that "[t]he Court ... does not de-
cide the [individual rights question] because it concludes in any event
that the petitioners are not entitled to the remedies they seek .... I would
resolve those remedial questions differently. Hence, I must decide, rather
than assume, the answer to the ... question....'"
When considered together, Sanchez-Llamas and Hamdan indicate
that the Supreme Court is likely split 4-4 on the question of whether Ar-
ticle 36 creates individual rights." 2 The dissent in Sanchez-Llamas
establishes that Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens favor
finding such a right. However, the positions taken by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals and the dissent in Hamdan indicate that Justices Tho-
mas, Scalia, Alito, and Roberts favor the general presumption that
"[i]nternational agreements.. .do not create private rights... in domestic
courts," 3 and thus are not likely to find individual rights under Article
36.
With the positions of eight Justices likely accounted for (and barring
subsequent changes in the composition of the Court), the vote of Justice
Kennedy should determine whether Article 36 creates individual rights.
Because Justice Kennedy joined the Hamdan majority opinion, which
strongly implied its support for finding individual rights under Common
Article 3-and because the case for finding rights under Article 36 is
stronger than the case for rights under Common Article 3-it is more
110. Id.
111. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2694 (2006).
112. If Justice O'Connor had not retired prior to Sanchez-Llamas, this issue may have
been decided differently. Dissenting in Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005), Justice
O'Connor noted, "[tihis Court has repeatedly enforced treaty-based rights of individual for-
eigners, allowing them to assert claims arising from various treaties," and "[the] rights
conferring language [in those treaties] is arguably no clearer than the Vienna Convention's is,
and they do not specify judicial enforcement." Id. at 686-87.
113. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987)).
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likely than not that he also supports finding individual rights under Arti-
cle 36, and therefore a majority of the Court would support finding
individual rights under Article 36.
The Sanchez-Llamas dissent's justification for finding that Article 36
creates rights for individual defendants relied on both domestic and in-
ternational law.'14 Because the VCCR is a self-executing treaty, which
"operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision,' "5 the Su-
premacy Clause requires that it "be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature." 6 Thus, Article 36 is "the supreme
law of the land."" 7 Accordingly, the proper methodology for determining
whether a treaty incorporates enforceable rights is to look "to the treaty
for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would a statute."' 8
The dissent determined that a statute containing the language of Ar-
ticle 36 would clearly be interpreted as creating an individual right. The
rights provided in Article 36 do not differ "from other procedural rights
that courts commonly enforce," and the provision "speaks directly of the
'rights' of the individual foreign national."" 9 Moreover, Article 36(1)(b)
refers explicitly to the "person," suggesting an enforceable individual
right is incorporated within the language of the Article 36.
The dissent also referred to the decisions of the ICJ in LaGrand
2 0
and Avena, both of which "ruled that an arrested foreign national may
raise a violation of the arresting authorities' obligation to 'inform [him]
without delay of his rights under' Article 36(1) in an American judicial
proceeding."'2 2 The dissent found that the ICJ's interpretation was enti-
tled to "'respectful consideration' . .. [which] counsels in favor of an
interpretation that is consistent with the ICJ's reading of the Convention
here.'23
Finally, the dissent responded to two arguments that are commonly
raised against finding an individual right. First, the United States has
argued that Article 36 rights of consular notification are state rights and
114. See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2690-99.
115. Id. at 2694. Justice Breyer is using language from Justice Marshall's opinion in
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
116. Id. (again quoting Foster v. Neilson).
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
118. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2695 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)).
119. Id.
120. LaGrand Case (ER.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
121. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12
(Mar. 31).
122. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2696.
123. Id. at 2697.
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not individual rights, 4 citing the "presumption" that treaties "will be
enforced through political and diplomatic channels, rather than through
the courts."' 25 The dissent rejected this "presumption" as illusory, and it
distinguished the few cases the government provided as support.
2 6 Al-
though the Head Money Cases state that a treaty "depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and ... honor of the gov-
ernments which are parties to it,' ' 27 they also "make clear that a treaty
may confer certain enforceable 'rights upon the citizens or subjects of
one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other.' ,,2 Sec-
ond, the dissent refused to adopt the executive branch interpretation of
Article 36 as creating no individual rights, reasoning that although the
interpretation is entitled to "great weight," it is not conclusive, and could
not be adopted where "language, the nature of the right, and the ICJ's
interpretation of the treaty taken separately or together so strongly point
to an intent to confer enforceable rights upon an individual."'
29 Based on
these considerations, the dissent concluded that the VCCR does, indeed,
create judicially enforceable rights, thereby entitling defendants to have
their Article 36 claims heard in U.S. courts.
B. The Suppression Issue
The Sanchez-Llamas majority and dissent disagreed on both the
source and the extent of remedies available to foreign nationals detained
under conditions violating Article 36. The majority, holding that domes-
tic law governed remedies, found that suppression of a detainee's
statements or confession was never an appropriate remedy for Article 36
violations. The dissent found, instead, that the language of the treaty it-
self dictated a remedy was required, and then found that suppression was
appropriate in certain circumstances.
1. Majority Opinion
The majority concluded that the VCCR "does not prescribe specific
remedies for violations of Article 36. Rather, [Article 36(2)] expressly
leaves the implementation of Article 36 to domestic law."'
30 As a result,
124. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 1 76; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Respondents at 20, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (Nos. 05-51,
04-10566), 2006 WL 271823.
125. Brief for United States, supra note 124, at 11.
126. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2697. The government cited Chariton
v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,474 (1913); Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 295 (1888); and Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 306 (1829). Brief for the United States, supra note 124, at 11.
127. 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
128. Sanchez-lamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2697 (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598).
129. Id. at 2698.
130. Id. at 2678 (majority opinion).
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domestic law controls the availability of an exclusionary remedy for Ar-
ticle 36 violations. The petitioner advanced two principal arguments in
support of a suppression remedy: 1) under its general supervisory au-
thority, the Supreme Court could impose an exclusionary remedy on
state courts, even if the VCCR did not specifically provide such a rem-
edy; '3 and 2) the "full effect" language of Article 36(2) implicitly
requires some judicial remedy,'32 and a remedy of suppression is consis-
tent with the broader policies underlying the exclusionary rule.1
33
In rejecting the first argument, the majority found that it possessed
no supervisory authority over state courts, and that any authority of the
Supreme Court "to develop remedies for the enforcement of federal
law"'3 4 existed only in federal courts.'35 A federal court "creat[ing] a judi-
cial remedy applicable in state courts"'13 6 would be engaging in
"lawmaking of [its] own."'137 Thus, only the VCCR itself could authorize
an exclusionary remedy for Article 36 violations.
The majority also found that the "full effect" language in Article
36(2) did not "implicitly require"'38 an exclusionary remedy. The major-
ity expressed doubt that Article 36 ever required a judicial remedy in a
criminal prosecution, and noted that no other country has interpreted Ar-
ticle 36 as providing a remedy in criminal cases. 39 Even if a judicial
remedy was required, the Court continued, it would not support a finding
of exclusion. Rather, Article 36(2) simply requires that any remedy con-
form "with the laws and regulations of the receiving State."'
40
For the majority, suppression would be a "vastly disproportionate"
remedy for Article 36 violations.' 4' Regardless of whether "the failure to
inform defendants of their right to consular notification [gave] them 'a
misleadingly incomplete picture of [their] legal options,'.. . other consti-
tutional and statutory protections-many of them already enforced by
the exclusionary rule-safeguard the same interests Sanchez-Llamas
claims are advanced by Article 36.',142 Further, the Court noted that ap-
131. Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 39, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126
S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3598178.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 44.
134. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2679.
135. This result indicates the Court does have the authority to impose an Article 36 rem-
edy on federal courts. However, the Sanchez-Llamas opinion offers no indication that the
Court would actually be inclined to use its authority to impose such a remedy.
136. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2671.
137. Id. at 2680.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2)).
141. Id. at 2681.
142. Id. at 2681-82 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 131, at 42).
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plying the exclusionary rule to Article 36 violations would be inconsis-
tent with the rule's general application to the fruits of unconstitutional
searches, seizures, and interrogations, where Article 36 compliance is
not even required at the time most searches and interrogations 
occur.143
Finally, the majority noted that "suppression is not the only means of
vindicating Vienna Convention rights. A defendant can raise an Article
36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his state-
ments to police."'4" In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg agreed
that a suppression remedy could not be implied from the "full effect"
language in Article 36(2). Rather, the possibility that a defendant, "in
fitting circumstances" might successfully raise an Article 36 claim in
voluntariness challenges gives "full effect" to Article 36 "in a manner
consistent with U.S. rules and regulations."'
4 5
2. Dissenting Opinion
While the majority looked to domestic law to determine whether a
suppression remedy is available, the dissent concluded that some remedy
is available based on the treaty language in Article 36(2). The only role
of domestic law, they found, should be to determine which remedy
should be applied. Under the dissent's interpretation of Article 36(2),
only a judicial remedy can satisfy the "full effect" requirement, which
domestic law must accommodate. This is a natural extension of the ICJ's
interpretation of the "full effect" language as requiring that "legal sig-
nificance" be attached to an Article 36 violation.
The dissent agreed that automatic exclusion, as would be required if
authorities violated a defendant's Miranda rights, 141 was not always ap-
propriate for Article 36 violations. However, the dissent did argue that
exclusion should be used when it is the only effective remedy avail-
able. 147 The dissent agreed with the majority and concurrence in
assessing Article 36 violations in the context of voluntariness chal-
lenges, 48 but it maintained that such an analysis will not always lead to
an effective remedy.
The dissent also dismissed as unfounded the majority's claim that
suppression would not be offered as a remedy in the 169 other countries
that are parties to the VCCR, 149 noting that in general, suppression of
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2682.
145. Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
146. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
147. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2706 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2707-08.
149. Id. at 2708-09. See also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000); Tan
Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Ct. Crim. App. N. Terr.) (Austi.) (using suppres-
1203Summer 20061
Michigan Journal of International Law
wrongfully obtained evidence is available as a remedy in many other
countries, and its origin is actually in English common law, not Ameri-
can law, as claimed in Justice Roberts' opinion."'° Because "the criminal
justice systems of different nations differ in important ways,' "' the
VCCR could not have listed specific remedies. The dissent interpreted
the "full effect" language in Article 36(2) as insisting upon effective
remedies and requiring that where suppression is the only means of pro-
viding an effective remedy, it must be applied.
C. Procedural Default
The Sanchez-Llamas majority and dissent also disagreed on the ef-
fect of procedural default rules on Article 36 claims. The majority found
that detainees raising Article 36 claims should not be exempted from
procedural default requirements despite the additional hardship they may
suffer because of the treaty violation. The dissent found that the treaty
claims should trump procedural default rules when there is no other way
to raise the claim and the Article 36 violation was itself the reason the
claim was not raised appropriately.
1. Majority Opinion
The majority held that the procedural default rule could be applied to
the Bustillo v. Johnson defendant's Article 36 claim, in direct contraven-
tion of the ICJ's holding in Avena. 52 The majority found no basis to
depart from its previous holding in Breard. 3 That decision provided
three reasons for rejecting Breard's contention that Article 36 trumped
federal procedural default rules: 1) it is widely recognized in interna-
tional law that "absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the
procedural rules of the forum state govern the implementation of the
treaty in that state;"'54 2) Article 36 rights should be construed in con-
formity with the laws of the receiving state; and 3) the federal procedural
default rule was enacted after Article 36, and thus "superseded any in-
consistent provision in the [VCCR]."'5
sion); Queen v. Tan (2001) W.A.S.C. 275 (Sup. Ct. W. Austl.) (considering suppression as a
remedy); Regina v. Partak, 160 C.C.C.3d 553 at para. 63 (2001) (Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (consider-
ing suppression as a remedy).
150. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2706.
151. Id.
152. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12, H 112-13 (Mar. 31).
153. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
154. Id. at 375-76.
155. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2703 (citing Breard, 523 U.S. at 376).
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The majority refused to distinguish Bustillo on the basis that it in-
volved a state procedural rule rather than a federal procedural rule,
noting that the federal-state distinction was not relevant in the Breard
procedural default analysis. Concurring in Sanchez-Llamas, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that "it would be unseemly ... for this Court to com-
mand state courts to relax their identical, or even less stringent
procedural default rules, while federal courts operate without constraint
in this regard."' 56 The majority also refused to exempt Article 36 claims
from procedural default requirements on the basis that such claims "are
most appropriately raised post-trial or on collateral review."' 57 The major-
ity accordingly held that a state could apply its ordinary procedural
default rules to Article 36 claims.
Most importantly, the majority refused to invalidate Breard based on
the ICJ's holding in Avena that application of procedural default rules to
some Article 36 claims violated the "full effect" language of Article
36(2).'-8 The majority found that, although the ICJ's interpretation of Ar-
ticle 36(2) was entitled to "respectful consideration" 59 Avena was not
binding on U.S. Courts, where "[niothing in the structure or purpose of
the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive
on our courts." '6° The Optional Protocol could not supersede the Su-
preme Court's constitutional authority to decide the issue. Further, the
United States' withdrawal from the Optional Protocol after Avena was




The majority proceeded to find that the ICJ's interpretation "over-
look[ed] the importance of procedural default rules in an adversary
system, which relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and
present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate
156. Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
157. Brief for Petitioner Mario A. Bustillo at 39, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (No. 05-51), 2005 WL 3597704. The brief cited Massaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500 (2003), which held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be raised for the
first time in a federal habeas corpus petition; requiring otherwise would force defendants to
raise such claims prior to developing an adequate factual basis. Although Sanchez-Llamas
does not foreclose this argument in federal habeas proceedings, the Sanchez-Llamas majority
determined that, although a defendant may not become aware of the legal basis for an Article
36 claim until after trial, the factual basis exists prior to trial. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at
2687. Thus, any attempt to raise this argument in a federal proceeding is unlikely to meet
with success.
158. See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2).
159. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685 (majority opinion).
160. ld. at 2684.
161. Id. at 2685.
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time for adjudication."' 62 The Court noted that under the ICJ's interpreta-
tion,
Article 36 claims could trump not only procedural default rules,
but any number of other rules requiring parties to present their
legal claims at the appropriate time for adjudication .... This
sweeps too broadly, for it reads the "full effect" proviso in a way
that leaves little room for Article 36's clear instruction that Arti-
cle 36 rights "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State.',
63
Exempting Article 36 claims from procedural default rules would
violate domestic law, which subjects even Miranda claims to procedural
default requirements.'"
In concurrence, Justice Ginsburg agreed that "it would be extraordi-
nary to hold that defendants, unaware of their Miranda rights because
the police failed to convey the required warnings, would be subject to a
State's procedural default rules, but defendants not told of Article 36
rights would face no such hindrance."' '65 In addition, Justice Ginsburg
noted that procedural default on an Article 36 claim could support a lar-
ger showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, in which case "'full
effect' could... [be] given to Article 36, without dishonoring state pro-
cedural rules that are compatible with due process.'66
2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent concluded that Article 36 should take precedence over
state procedural law when two circumstances are met simultaneously:
(1) when "the defendant's failure to raise a Convention matter (e.g., that
police failed to inform him of his Article 36 rights) can be traced to the
failure of the police (or other governmental authorities) to inform the
defendant of those Convention rights,' ', 67 and (2) when "state law does
not provide any other effective way for the defendant to raise that issue
(say, through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).' 68 The dissent
provided three reasons for coming to this conclusion. First, in order to
give full effect to the provisions of the VCCR and to interpret it such that
it conforms with the laws of the United States, the dissent concluded that
Article 36 must trump state procedural rules when the two criteria set
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2686 (quoting VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2)).
164. Id. at 2687.
165. Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 2690 n.3.
167. Id. at 2698 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
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forth above are met.' 69 Second, the drafting history of the Convention
shows that "full effect" means much more than preventing domestic law
from nullifying Article 36.170 While the original phrasing stated that do-
mestic law should "not nullify" the rights of the Convention, this phrase
was later replaced with an amendment requiring parties to the Conven-
tion to give "full effect" to the rights of the VCCR. The dissent claimed
that such a shift in vocabulary requires an affirmative effort to give such
rights full effect if domestic law stands in the way.171
Finally, the dissent found that the majority misinterpreted the ICJ's
views in Avena and LaGrand on the effect of default rules on Article 36
claims. It argued that the ICJ's opinions require only that the VCCR by-
pass procedural default rules when there is no other effective remedy,
and when the remedy is unavailable due to the failure of U.S. authorities
to observe the mandates of Article 36. The dissent concluded that the
majority's "reluctance to give LaGrand and Avena this perfectly reason-
able interpretation reflects a failure to provide in practice the 'respectful
consideration' that we all believe the law demands.' 72
The dissent also criticized the majority's reliance on Breard, which it
maintained could be distinguished on the basis that it addressed federal,
rather than state, procedural default rules. Unlike .the majority, the dis-
sent found "no anomaly in treating state law differently from federal law
for these purposes."' 73 Thus, allowing Article 36 to overrule state proce-
dural rules would not violate Breard's precedent.' The ICJ's opinions in
both Avena and LaGrand, which were issued by the ICJ after the Su-
preme Court published its Breard opinion, give further support to this
position. The dissent agreed with the ICJ's determinations in Avena and
LaGrand that state procedural default rules must sometimes give way to
the rights set forth by the VCCR, and that reaching this result "requires
no more than reading an exception into Breard's language."'75 In light of
these considerations, the dissent believed there was enough support to
remand Bustillo to the Virginia court for consideration on the merits of
Bustillo's underlying claim.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2698-99.
171. Id. See also Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Consular Relations, art. 36(2),
13th Sess., reprinted in LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 237
(1966); United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Official Records, Summary re-
cords of plenary meetings and of the meetings of the First and Second Committees, In 26, 30,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16 (1963).
172. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2703.
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IV. REMEDIES
A. Judicial Remedies
The Sanchez-Llamas majority expressed "doubt" that Article 36 re-
quires any "judicial remedy in ... criminal prosecutions"' 7 6 Further,
under the majority's interpretation of Article 36(2), any remedy for an
Article 36 violation must exist within domestic law. 17' Thus, the same
reasoning used to preclude suppression as a remedy would also apply to
other remedies commonly sought for Article 36 violations, such as dis-
missal of the indictment."' Under domestic law, dismissal of the
indictment as a remedy is applied even more restrictively than the exclu-
sionary rule, where "[s]o drastic a step ... [would] increase to an
intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the
guilty brought to book."' 9 If an Article 36 violation does not merit sup-
pression, it is highly unlikely that dismissal of the indictment is available
as a remedy.
1. Voluntariness
Although judicial remedies may not be available for an Article 36
violation as specifically set forth in the VCCR, the Sanchez-Llamas ma-
jority expressly provided that "a defendant can raise an Article 36 claim
as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to
police."' 0 However, "Article 36 has nothing whatsoever to do with
searches or interrogations,' ' 8 ' and "[i]n most circumstances, there is
likely to be little connection between an Article 36 violation and evi-
dence or statements obtained by police."'8 2 Thus, the majority implied
that voluntariness challenges will rarely be a basis of relief for Article 36
violations. However, the majority also noted that many "constitutional
and statutory protections ... safeguard the same interests Sanchez-
Llamas claims are advanced by Article 36. '83 Foreign nationals who are
unable to obtain relief from Article 36 violations may still use such pro-
tections to address any underlying harm caused by language or cultural
barriers.
176. Id. at 2680 (majority opinion).
177. Id.
178. As indicated supra text accompanying notes 80-83, many circuits have already
barred dismissal as a remedy.
179. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966).
180. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
181. Id. at 2681.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2682.
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The majority's statement that an Article 36 violation can be raised as
part of a "challenge to the voluntariness of ... statements to police,"'"
refers to the Fifth Amendment privilege against coerced or involuntary
confessions.' To evaluate the voluntariness of confessions by criminal
defendants, state and federal courts "examine the 'totality of the circum-
stances' to discover if the confessant's will was overborne.' ' 6
Voluntariness determinations rarely turn on "the absence or presence of a
single .. . criterion.!" Rather, each "reflect[s] careful scrutiny of all the
surrounding circumstances, ' '"' including:
the youth of ... the accused ... ; his lack of education ... ; or
his low intelligence ... ; the lack of any advice to the accused of
his constitutional rights ... ; the length of the detention ... ; the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning ... ; and the
use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or
sleep .... 1'9
In addition, as a "necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not
'voluntary,' "'9 there must be active governmental misconduct,' 9' which
is causally related to the decision to confess.' 92
After Sanchez-Llamas, Article 36 claims should be included in the
totality of the circumstances test applied by state and federal courts to
determine whether "a confessant's will was overborne."' 93 The test
should incorporate both the violation of Article 36 by authorities and any
underlying harm caused by language or cultural barriers. Unlike chal-
lenges related to the waiver of constitutional rights, voluntariness
determinations depend on "the level of police coercion,"'' 94 rather than
"the defendant's mental state."' 95 The violation of Article 36 by authori-
ties can be raised to demonstrate the element of coercion in a
voluntariness challenge.
184. Id.
185. Smith v. Duckworth, 856 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Columbe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1997); Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); and Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) for instances where courts has invoked the totality of the circum-
stances test for involuntary confessions.
186. Smith, 856 F.2d at 912.
187. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 164.
193. Smith v. Duckworth, 856 F.2d 909,912 (1988).
194. Id. at 913.
195. Id. at 912-13.
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An example of an Article 36 claim raised "as part of a broader chal-
lenge to the voluntariness of... statements to ... police"'196 is found in
Sanchez-Llamas' Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The totality of the cir-
cumstances in this challenge included the fact that Sanchez-Llamas
came from "an area in Mexico where people greatly fear the police and
do not believe that they can refuse to answer police questions,"'97 and
that understanding his Miranda warnings "required an 8th or 9th grade
level of education... [and that] petitioner had poor language skills in his
native language."'9' In addition, the violation of Article 36 was raised to
demonstrate deliberate "police misconduct." '99 Sanchez-Llamas claimed
that by violating his Article 36 rights, the police deprived him of "the
very procedures that were established to ensure that he understood his
rights in the American criminal justice system.'20°
Including Article 36 violations in the totality of the circumstances
may increase the likelihood of obtaining relief for some foreign nation-
als. In Sosa v. Dretke, a foreign defendant raised a voluntariness
challenge alleging that his limited knowledge of the English language,
his submissive personality, and his mental impairment rendered his
statements to police involuntary.2°' The Fifth Circuit denied relief on the
basis that the defendant offered no evidence that governmental miscon-
duct impacted his decision to confess.2 2 If the defendant in Sosa had
raised an Article 36 violation as evidence of governmental misconduct,
however, his challenge may have been successful.
A trial judge in a Georgia death penalty case involving a Mexican
national ruled that Article 36 does not create individual rights, but at the
same time recognized the importance of Article 36 violations by giving a
jury instruction that such violations are to be considered in the totality of
the circumstances test.203 The charge stated:
[I]ndividual treaties do not create individual rights which are
privately enforceable in court proceedings. Any failure by the
police to inform Defendant of his rights under this treaty would
not, by itself, make his statement involuntary. You may or may
not, in your discretion, consider this evidence along with all the
196. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
197. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 2974437.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 25.
200. Id.
201. 133 F. App'x 114 (5th Cir. 2005).
202. Id. at 120.
203. See Kadish, supra note 61, at 41.
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other evidence in determining the voluntariness of Defendant's
statements .
Although both the Sanchez-Llamas majority and concurring opin-
ions agree that suppression law does not directly apply to Article 36
violations, the decision clearly permits trial courts to consider an Article
36 infraction in instructing a jury on voluntariness. These same consid-
erations are relevant in voluntariness challenges arising in other contexts.
The United States Code provides procedural safeguards that often result
in challenges to confessions or seizures of evidence based on lack of
voluntariness. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea upon demonstrating
a "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal, which includes a showing
that the plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. The Tenth
Circuit addressed this argument in United States v. Cazares, in which the
defendant argued that an Article 36 violation rendered his guilty plea
unknowing and involuntary. He claimed that [as] "a foreign national,
he lack[ed] an understanding of the criminal justice system in the United
States.... [and] his lack of understanding would [have been] remedied
by the assistance of the Mexican consulate." 207 Although the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected the claim for lack of specificity, the claim remains available
for future defendants seeking to withdraw guilty pleas.
Although foreign nationals may have opportunities to raise Article
36 violations in voluntariness challenges, significant practical barriers
exist to obtaining relief in such challenges. First, proof must be offered
that the defendant would have exercised the right to have her consulate
notified of the arrest. At least one study conducted in Georgia suggests
that less than fifteen percent of foreign nationals from VCCR countries0 8
who are jailed prior to trial ask to have their consulate notified 9.20 The
204. Jury Instructions at 8, State v. Bautista Ramirez, No. OOCR-3159-4 (Dekalb
County Super. Ct. June 16, 2003).
205. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e).
206. 60 F. App'x 223 (10th Cir. 2003).
207. Id. at 227.
208. This statistic refers to countries that do not have bilateral treaties with the United
States that require the consulate be notified of all arrests of their nationals regardless of the
individual's wishes. Fifty-six countries are classed by the State Department as "mandatory
notification" countries. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS, IN-
STRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR
OFFICIALS TO ASSIST THEM 5 (2002 ed.) [hereinafter DoS BLUE BOOK].
209.
In 2003, at the request of the Department of State, the State of Georgia conducted a
survey of all jail admissions in 37 counties during the period from August 31, 2003,
through September 14, 2003. During that period, 6,920 individuals were detained,
552 of whom were identified as foreign nationals (7.9%). Almost three-fourths
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Georgia study shows that the vast majority of arrested foreign nationals
do not want the authorities in their countries to know that they have been
arrested in the United States and, significantly, despite the array of ser-
vices that the Mexican government makes available to its nationals
detained in the United States, the percentage of Mexicans requesting
consular notification is no higher than that of other countries. 210 This
suggests that some foreign nationals' distrust of their own governments
trumps their desire for consular help in navigating the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system.
The second obstacle, no less formidable, potentially pits Article 36
against other treaty provisions related to consular immunity. A foreign
national will endeavor to show actual prejudice by offering an affidavit
from the local consulate showing what the consulate would have done to
assist in the defense of the foreign national upon notification of his ar-
rest. Such affidavits are subject to evidentiary objections by the
prosecution including, significantly, that the affidavit is not subject to
cross-examination. While consular officials may be willing to provide
the affidavit, few consulates may be willing to waive their immunity un-
der Articles 432" and 44212 of the VCCR and face cross-examination
about the substantive contents of the sworn statement.
Finally, as noted in the Avena decision, defendants must overcome
the fact that authorities do not have to advise a foreign national of his or
her rights under Article 36 prior to beginning interrogation, nor does
the consulate have to be informed immediately of the accused's arrest,
even if he or she requests that the consulate be notified.2 4 Defendants
(72%) of the foreign nationals were eligible for consular notification under Article
36 of the VCCR (the remainder were from mandatory notification countries). Only
77 (13%) requested that their consulate be notified of their arrest and detention after
being advised on their rights under Article 36 of the VCCR.
Brief for the Nat'l District Attorneys' Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10
n. 19, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 497761.
210. Id. at 10 n.20.
211. "Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction
of the judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed
in the exercise of consular functions." VCCR, supra note 1, art. 43.
212. "Members of a consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning
matters connected with the exercise of their functions or to produce official correspondence
and documents relating thereto. They are also entitled to decline to give evidence as expert
witnesses with regard to the law of the sending State." VCCR, supra note 1, art. 44. See also
Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1984).
213. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12, 63 (Mar. 31).
214. Id. 97 (finding that a delay of three business days in sending notice to the consu-
late met the requirements of Article 36(l)(b)).
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may therefore have divulged damaging information before consular as-
sistance becomes available.
Due to these practical problems, many foreign nationals will be un-
able to obtain relief from Article 36 violations through voluntariness
challenges. However, relief may still be available to foreign nationals
through other "constitutional and statutory protections [that] ... safe-
guard the ... interests ... advanced by Article 36.
'25 For example,
before a court can decide whether a "confession itself [is] voluntary,
21 6 it
must find "that a defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his or her Miranda rights. 21 7 Any underlying harm caused by language
or cultural barriers can be raised by a foreign national to allege that her
Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
A Miranda waiver is not knowing and intelligent if the waiving
party lacks a full understanding of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences of his waiver.28 If a foreign national's waiver of her right
against self-incrimination is not knowing and intelligent, her statements
must be suppressed, regardless of whether an Article 36 violation oc-
curred. As Justice Ginsburg explained in her Sanchez-Llamas
concurrence, a detained foreign national who, due to language or cultural
barriers, did not fully comprehend her Miranda rights "would have little
need to invoke the Vienna Convention, for Miranda warnings a defen-
dant is unable to comprehend give the police no green light for
interrogation. 219 Under the longstanding Johnson v. Zerbst standard for
waiver, courts must consider "the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding th[e] case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused., 220 This analysis could include a foreign national's poor
English language skills, experiences in her country of origin,
22' or other
language or cultural barriers that detract from the defendant's under-
standing of her rights in the U.S. legal system.
222 These challenges offer
an alternative basis for relief for foreign nationals who do not understand
their fundamental rights. For example, in United States v. Garibay, the
Ninth Circuit held that a foreign national's Miranda waiver was not
215. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681 (2006).
216. Smith v. Duckworth, 856 F.2d 909,911 (1988).
217. Id.
218. United States v. Bums, 433 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005).
219. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2688.
220. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d
1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights.").
221. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
222. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Bar Associations, Human Rights Organizations and
Other Legal Groups in Support of Petitioners at 15-16, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
2669 (2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51), 2005 WL 3543084.
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knowing and intelligent, where the defendant had little understanding of
English and did not receive Miranda warnings in his native language.223
Further, he did not sign a written waiver of his rights, was not provided
with an interpreter, and had no previous experience with the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system. 24
The main problem foreign nationals face in attempting to challenge
Miranda waivers is that reviewing courts do not adequately consider the
impact of cultural barriers. Justice Breyer took special note of this prob-
lem in his Sanchez-Llamas dissent, describing the following two
hypothetical defendants whose grievances would not be adequately ad-
dressed in a traditional challenge to the waiver of Miranda rights: 1) "a
person who fully understands his Miranda rights but does not fully un-
derstand the implications of these rights for our legal system, 225 and 2)
"a foreign national.. .who comes from a country where confessions
made to the police cannot be used in court as evidence, who does not
understand that a state-provided lawyer can provide him crucial assis-
tance in an interrogation, and whose native community has great fear of
police abuse. 226
Previous precedent validated Justice Breyer's concerns that such cul-
tural barriers would not be adequately addressed in most court
challenges. For example, in United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, the
court of appeals found a knowing and intelligent waiver where the Mexi-
can defendant
read the [Spanish-language] form describing his Miranda rights
and claimed to understand these rights, subsequently signing the
waiver when asked if he was willing to do so. He later said he
remembered and still understood his rights, and indicated that he
did not wish to have them read to him.227
This decision might have been different if the Ninth Circuit's analy-
sis had considered that "under Mexican criminal law, statements given to
the police during an interrogation are deemed to have no evidentiary
value ... [and] cannot serve as the sole basis for ... prosecution. 228 In
United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado,
223. 143 F.3d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1998).
224. Id.
225. 126 S. Ct. at 2706 (noting such a defendant may not be able to show that his con-
fession was involuntary).
226. Id.
227. 756 F2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
228. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of
Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 10, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006)
(No. 04-10566), WL 3543087.
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[Police officers] knocked on the door and [Silva, a Mexican na-
tional] answered. ... [Officer] Hascall spoke some Spanish and
stated in Spanish that he was a police officer and asked for per-
mission to enter the room. Silva said "Si," backed away from the
door, and motioned with his arms for the officers to enter the
room .... Hascall then asked Silva for permission to search the
room for drugs. Silva consented.229
The Ninth Circuit found that consent to search was given voluntarily on
the basis that "the officers did not draw their guns or threaten to obtain a
search warrant if consent was refused... [and] after [police] asked Silva
in Spanish whether the officers could enter the room, Silva said 'si' and
motioned for the officers to enter."230 In this context, cultural barriers-
including Silva's experience with police in his home country-are highly
relevant to his ability to consent to the search. The Sanchez-Llamas dis-
sent recognized the importance of such barriers.
Cultural barriers can be addressed if defense attorneys make a con-
certed effort to increase awareness of them when raising challenges to
voluntariness, or to waivers of rights by foreign nationals. The voluntari-
ness question has already been adapted to reflect similar concerns that
arise with juvenile confessions. The Supreme Court, in Application of
Gault, recognized that juveniles who are read their constitutional rights
do not necessarily appreciate those rights, and "special problems may
arise with respect to waiver. .,23 Regarding juvenile confessions, "the
greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in
the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it
was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
or despair.' 232 Gault demonstrates that the law's current inadequacy with
regard to cultural barriers can be corrected. A strong analogy can be
drawn between Gault and Sanchez-Llamas. Defense attorneys represent-
ing foreign nationals should emphasize that, like juveniles, "[d]etained
foreign nationals are similarly susceptible to fear and manipulation, both
of which are compounded by the language barriers they often face."
233
Existing law provides additional mechanisms that could be adapted
to address the harm caused by cultural barriers. For example, when a
waiver occurs during court proceedings, trial courts could question de-
fendants about cultural factors to ensure that they understand the
implications of waiver. The Ninth Circuit requires that:
229. 399 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9thCir. 2005).
230. Id. at 1126.
231. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
232. Id.
233. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 9, at 8.
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The right to a jury trial ... [must] be waived ... voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently ... [and] to comply with this ...
requirement, a district court should inform the defendant that 1)
twelve members of the community compose a jury, 2) the defen-
dant may take part in jury selection, 3) a jury verdict must be
unanimous, and 4) the court alone decides guilt or innocence if
the defendant waives a jury trial. Furthermore, the district court
should question the defendant to ascertain whether the defendant
understands the benefits and burdens of a jury trial and freely
chooses to waive a jury.'3"
A similar procedure could be used to address cultural barriers. Prior to
accepting a waiver by a foreign national, a trial court could, for example,
ask the foreign national to explain his understanding of the role of his
defense lawyer.
Sanchez-Llamas may permit consideration of these same factors in
conjunction with the waiver of any fundamental right. A foreign na-
tional's waiver of the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial, the right to
be present at trial, or any other constitutional right must be knowing and
intelligent, as well as any consent to search, or decision to plead guilty to
a criminal charge. A waiver of a fundamental right that is not knowing
and intelligent violates due process and can be remedied through sup-
pression, dismissal of an indictment, or the overturning of a final
conviction. Many statutes also impose requirements for knowing and
intelligent waiver or consent. For example, the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure requires that a defendant must knowingly and intelligently
consent to trial before a magistrate judge,235 trial delays,236 or trial before
a jury with fewer than twelve members.237 A defendant must knowingly
and intelligently waive the right to request DNA testing of evidence, 238 a
preliminary hearing, 239 an indictment, ' ° or the right to be present at court
241proceedings .
The protections listed above are all examples of "constitutional and
statutory protections [that] ... safeguard the ... interests ... advanced
by Article 36.' '242 A foreign national can raise any harm caused by lan-
guage or cultural barriers in conjunction with these protections.
234. United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F3d 1093, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2005).
235. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(5).
236. Id. r. 5.1(d).
237. Id. r. 23(b)(2).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3)(A)(i) (2004).
239. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(1).
240. Id. r. 7(b).
241. Id. r. 43(c).
242. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669,2681 (2006).
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Although the impact of language and cultural barriers is the primary ba-
sis for relief in these challenges, an Article 36 violation could be raised
to demonstrate that the absence of consular assistance decreased the like-
lihood that the waiver or consent at issue was knowing and intelligent.
After Sanchez-Llamas, the violation of Article 36 by authorities may
play a role in some voluntariness challenges. This role will most likely
be limited. However, foreign nationals who are unable to obtain relief
from Article 36 violations may be able to address the harm caused by
language and cultural barriers under domestic law provisions. Raising
Article 36 violations may draw attention to the effects of these barriers
and provide relief for some defendants. That the Sanchez-Llamas dissent
recognized the issue of cultural barriers suggests the Court may continue
to examine it in later decisions.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Under the Sanchez-Llamas majority's interpretation of the "full ef-
fect" language in Article 36(2), an Article 36 violation could be raised in
conjunction with any of the "constitutional and statutory protections...
[that] safeguard the same interests Sanchez-Llamas claims are advanced
by Article 36. ,243 The majority specifically listed due process protections
and the right to counsel as examples, but this list is not exclusive. Under
the appropriate facts, an Article 36 claim could support any constitu-
tional or statutory challenge where it is relevant that "the failure to
inform defendants of their right to consular notification gives them a
'misleadingly incomplete picture of [their] legal options.' ,,24
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be the most promising
means of addressing Article 36 violations in the future. Any prejudice
from an Article 36 violation that occurs after a foreign national obtains
counsel can likely support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
To succeed on such a claim, a claimant must demonstrate that 1) coun-
sel's performance was deficient, and 2) that the deficient performance
actually prejudiced the defendant. 245 Prior to Sanchez-Llamas, lower
courts had suggested that failure by counsel to raise consular assistance
issues could be a basis for an ineffective assistance claim. For example,
in Ledezma v. State, the Supreme Court of Iowa expressed its belief that
"all criminal defense attorneys representing foreign nationals should be
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 10-11, Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3598178.
245. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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apprised of Article 36 ... and that they "[have] a duty to investigate
the applicable national and foreign laws. 247
During oral arguments in Sanchez-Llamas, a considerable portion of
the time allotted for argument was spent discussing a defense counsel's
role in notifying foreign nationals of Article 36 requirements and bene-
fits. Several Justices made statements to the effect that a defense "lawyer
should be taxed with knowing that [a foreign national has a right to con-
sular assistance] ... because it's the law of the land .... [T]he
obligation is on the lawyer to [ask if the defendant received notice of his
Article 36 rights] just as the lawyer would [ask if they received] the
Miranda warnings."24' Thus, if counsel fails to inform the foreign na-
tional about consular assistance rights, "then that's ineffective assistance
in an appropriate circumstance .... And the other obligation is, counsel,
you have to raise this issue as soon as everybody learns about it ...."249
These statements demonstrate that a defense attorney representing a
foreign national has two obligations with regard to Article 36. First,
counsel is charged with a duty to notify a foreign national of her consu-
lar assistance rights. Second, counsel must raise any Article 36 violation
at the proper time. Failure to do either of these should satisfy the defi-
cient performance prong of the Strickland ineffectiveness test. A foreign
national who suffers prejudice as a result of this failure has a reasonable
chance of succeeding on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
Strickland.
During oral arguments, several Justices suggested that the facts un-
derlying Bustillo v. Johnson demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Bustillo, the defendant presented a theory, supported by the
testimony of two witnesses, that a man named "Sirena" committed the
crime.250 Bustillo did not learn of his right to contact the Honduran con-
sulate until after conviction, at which time the consulate located
additional evidence supporting this theory, including a critical taped con-
fession by Sirena.25 Counsel's failure to address clear Article 36 issues
led to both the procedural default of Bustillo's Article 36 claim and the
inability to present crucial evidence at trial. Ultimately, the majority
concluded that Bustillo's counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue
his Article 36 claim and therefore was not ineffective under Strickland.
22
246. 626 N.W.3d 134, 150 (Iowa 2001).
247. Id. at 152.
248. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669
(2006) (No 04-10566), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument
_transcripts/04-10566.pdf.
249. Id. at 31.
250. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2676.
251. Id. at 2676-77.
252. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 248, at 58-59.
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Despite failing in Bustillo's case, ineffective assistance of counsel
claims can provide a basis for obtaining relief from Article 36 violations
that is superior to voluntariness challenges. To establish ineffectiveness,
a foreign national need only demonstrate prejudice, since the Article 36
violation itself should be sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance
requirement, unless the decision not to contact the consulate is a strate-
gic one made by his counsel.253 In Bustillo, defense counsel was the son
of Salvadoran diplomats and was familiar with Article 36 issues, but he
decided it would be better to limit the number of people to whom his
client spoke.254 The Bustillo ineffectiveness issue was unique to its facts.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are likely the most promising
means of obtaining relief for Article 36 violations.2
3. Other Constitutional Remedies
Article 36 violations may serve as the ground for other constitutional
challenges. Many Article 36 claims involve difficulties foreign nationals
face in locating witnesses, evidence, and qualified counsel. Where in-
ability to obtain evidence results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
an Article 36 violation may sustain a due process challenge. This could
occur if the lack of consular access prevented the foreign national from
obtaining evidence crucial to her defense. In Valdez v. State, the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals overturned a death sentence, where, as a result of
an Article 36 violation, "the jury was not presented with very significant
and important evidence bearing upon Petitioner's mental status and psy-
che at the time of the crime." '56
Depending on the facts at issue, an Article 36 claim could be incor-
porated into any number of statutory or constitutional challenges. For
example, an Article 36 violation could be raised to demonstrate "good
cause" for the failure to meet the statutory deadline for notification of
the intent to present an alibi witness.257 Under certain facts, an Article 36
claim could also be raised to establish a speedy trial violation in contra-
vention of the Sixth Amendment. The four-pronged test for failure to
provide a speedy trial includes, in part, consideration of the reason for
the delay and whether the defendant asserted her right to a speedy trial.258
253. Under Strickland, counsel's strategic decisions made after a thorough investigation
of relevant law and facts cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
254. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 248, at 58-59.
255. Id. at 29, 31.
256. 46 P.3d 703, 710 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
257. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
258. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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The Second Circuit in United States v. Carini, in finding a speedy trial
violation, considered that
the defendant, ... though certainly not by an evil intent on the
part of the prosecutors, was misled and lulled into not pressing
for trial during this 16-month period because of his justifiable
belief that the prosecution had the authority to offer him the at-
2591tractive plea bargain it was then proposing.
By analogy, if a foreign national can establish that lack of consular assis-
tance in violation of Article 36 similarly prevented him from asserting
his right to a speedy trial, this could excuse his failure to assert the right
and also support an argument that the delay should be attributed to the
government.
The Sanchez-Llamas majority demonstrated some sensitivity to the
positions of foreign nationals in situations such as this by providing that,
when a defendant learns of her Article 36 rights at trial, "a court can
make appropriate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures,
to the extent possible, the benefits of consular assistance. 26 Although
this provision is not, in itself, a specific judicial remedy, a court's failure
to "make appropriate accommodations" could support more specific
remediation in future litigation. For example, as noted above, in United
States v. Beckford, the Fourth Circuit denied relief on an Article 36 claim
based on the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance after the defen-
dant learned of his Article 36 rights at trial.2 6' Given the holding in
Sanchez-Llamas, foreign nationals like the defendant in Beckford may be
entitled to judicial relief-the denial of a continuance is reversible error
if the trial court abuses its discretion, resulting in actual prejudice to the
defendant.2 62 Sanchez-Llamas offers strong support for an argument that
refusing to continue proceedings to allow exercise of Article 36 rights
constitutes an abuse of discretion. The denial of a continuance also can
violate due process if the defendant is prejudiced by "an unreasoning
and arbitrary 'insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay.' ,263 After Sanchez-Llamas, requesting a continuance to
exercise Article 36 rights is arguably "a justifiable request for delay."
In any circumstances where a trial court's failure to "make appropri-
ate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent
possible, the benefits of consular assistance '264 prejudices a defendant,
259. 562 F.2d 144, 149 (N.Y. 1977).
260. 126 S. Ct. at 2682 (2006).
261. No. 97-4926, 2000 WL 376155, at * 13 (4th Cir. May 3, 2000).
262. United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2006).
263. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).
264. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2682.
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the defendant undoubtedly should seek a specific judicial remedy. The
specific remedy sought should vary based on the underlying facts. San-
chez-Llamas suggests that no objective standard exists for granting relief
on Article 36 claims. Rather, the availability of relief will depend on sub-
jective factors that vary for individual defendants. Questions of
voluntariness and waiver will turn on a foreign national's proficiency in
English and his prior experience with American or other criminal justice
systems. This was evident in United States v. Salas, in which the Fourth
Circuit found that consent to search was voluntary, where "[a]t the time
of the encounter, Salas had been living in the United States for four years
and appeared to the officers to speak and understand English with little
difficulty.2 65 It may therefore be more likely that those defendants who
have recently arrived in the United States or who are most unfamiliar
with its culture will obtain relief on this basis.
In other constitutional challenges, relief will depend on the degree of
prejudice suffered by the defendant. A final conviction will not be over-
turned unless a constitutional violation prejudices the defendant at trial.
A constitutional error is "harmless" if a reviewing court is "able to de-
clare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 266 For
example, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Santos assumed without
deciding that an Article 36 violation rendered a defendant's confession
involuntary, but the court denied relief because the error was harmless in
light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.267 An Article 36 violation
would also be harmless if the evidence subject to dispute duplicated
other evidence presented at trial. Many federal circuit court decisions
have applied a prejudice analysis to Article 36 claims whether or not
constitutionally based. As in voluntariness challenges, the personal char-
acteristics of a defendant will be relevant to the degree of prejudice
suffered from an Article 36 violation. For example, the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Minjares-Alvarez found no prejudice where the defen-
dant "was raised primarily in the United States, ... understood his
constitutional rights, and was generally familiar with this country's
,,269criminal processes.
Many courts also require a defendant to show "what the consular of-
ficial would have advised ... [and] how the help the consul might have
given him would have added to or varied from the assistance that an at-
torney would have provided, which assistance he knowingly waived."
270
265. No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec 31, 1998).
266. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
267. 235 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2000).
268. See, e.g., State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio 2001).
269. 264 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2001).
270. United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 747 (D. V.I. 1999).
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Countries offer a wide "spectrum of consular intervention," providing
varying levels of assistance based on the nature of the underlying offense
and the punishment authorized for the offense, "relevant national poli-
cies," the type 27' and size of the consulate, the resources available to the
consulate,272 the distance between the consulate and where the accused is
incarcerated, and in some cases, the foreign policy of the United
States. 7 ' The Mexican consulate offers a great deal of assistance and will
provide interpreters, secure counsel, supply evidence, locate and trans-
port witnesses, attend legal proceedings, and collect and present
mitigating evidence at sentencing.7 4 In contrast, the British consulate
informs its nationals that it will do "all we properly can to contact you
within 24 hours of being told that you have been detained ... [but will
not] interfere in . .. court proceedings ... give .. . legal advice, investi-
gate crimes[,] or carry out searches for missing people. 2 5 Thus, a
Mexican national and a British national who suffered the same violation
would not necessarily be entitled to the same Article 36 relief.
When consular assistance is available on a purely discretionary ba-
sis, it will be difficult for a foreign national to demonstrate what the
consulate would have done if contacted. For example, the Philippine
consulate, "as may be appropriate in particular cases and to the extent
permitted by its limited resources" 27 6 may provide any of the following:
a list of lawyers; advice on dealings with authorities; intervention in ju-
271. The VCCR divides consulates into four classes: consulates-general, consulates, vice
consulates and consular agencies. Embassies may also perform consular functions. VCCR,
supra note 1, arts. 1, 3. Consulates are further classified based on whether they are staffed by
career foreign service personnel or by an honorary consul who may be a national of the re-
ceiving state. Id. arts. 1, 58.
272. ANNE JAMES & MARK WARREN, A UNIVERSAL SAFEGUARD: PROVIDING CONSULAR
ASSISTANCE TO NATIONALS IN CUSTODY, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE FOR CONSULAR OFFICERS
28 (undated) ("Not all consular officers are endowed with the means to provide the full range
of consular assistance...."). Evidence of what consular service would have been provided
may be subject to scrutiny or excluded altogether, or consulates may be reluctant to provide
such evidence at all. See supra text accompanying notes 211 and 212.
273. For example, the United States requires personnel assigned to diplomatic or consu-
lar posts from Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Iran to "request the
Department's permission to travel ... in advance of all proposed travel." See U.S. Dep't of
State, Office of Foreign Missions, Travel Program, http://www.state.gov/ofm/travel/.
274. Application Instituting Proceedings, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) at III.B.23 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/imus/imusorder/imus-iapplication_20030109.PDF.
275. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, What the Consular Department Can and
Cannot Do for You (Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.britainusa.com (search for document title).
See also R v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs ex parte Butt, [July 9,
1999] (116) ILR 608 (Court of Appeal) (U.K.).
276. Partnership for Distressed Filipino Nationals in the United States of America at 2.4,
(Agreement between the Philippine Foreign Service and a consortium of Filipino-American
organizations), http://www.naffaa.org/2005naffaa/files/030520moupabarpdfa.pdf.
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dicial proceedings if a prima facie miscarriage of justice exists; contact
with detained nationals; and information for the relatives of the nation-
277als. However, "the question of whether and how far the protection of a
Filipino national's interests should be exercised is-as a rule-a matter
for the Government to decide from case to case. 278 In light of these con-
siderations, relief for future Article 36 violations will be highly fact-
dependent and will not be equally available to all defendants, even those
from the same country.27 9
B. Diplomatic Remedies
Because Sanchez-Llamas limits judicial remedies for future Article
36 violations, greater emphasis must be placed on diplomatic methods
for obtaining relief. The Sanchez-Llamas majority expressly designated
diplomatic avenues as "the primary means of enforcing" the VCCR.28°
Both the executive and legislative branches have the power to enforce
Article 36 requirements, and both may be susceptible to political pres-
sure from domestic and international sources.
1. Executive Channels
The executive branch has both preventive and remedial powers with
regard to Article 36 violations. The federal government's preventive
powers consist primarily of educational efforts aimed at increasing Arti-
cle 36 compliance and preventing the recurrence of Article 36
violations.2 1' Remedial powers include: 1) State Department investiga-
tions into specific cases of Article 36 noncompliance; 2) the issuance of
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Within the last several years, foreign nationals have attempted at least two instances
to use the courts in their countries to force their governments to provide consular services to
detained citizens. In Khadr v. Canada, a Canadian citizen being held by the United States at
the detention facility at Guantd'amo Bay, Cuba, brought a mandamus action against the Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs to compel Canada to provide him with the consular services specified
in the "Guide for Canadians Imprisoned Abroad." Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs), [2005] F.C. 135 (Can.). In R v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs ex
parte Butt, [July 9, 19991 (116) ILR 608 (Court of Appeal) (U.K.), nine British nationals who
were being prosecuted in Yemen on terrorism changes brought a similar action in England to
have the court order the Foreign and Commonwealth Office "to make personal representations
to the President of Yemen, that the present trial be halted, that an independent medical com-
missioner to examine the torture aspect be appointed, and that a retrial be ordered." While
neither of these actions was successful, they may portend future attempts to use litigation as a
means of influencing diplomatic personnel to provide consular services. See also R. v. Sec'y
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWHC 972 (Admin) (Libyan national
who was a longtime resident of the United Kingdom brought action to compel the U.K. Gov-
ernment to act on his behalf).
280. 126 S. Ct. at 2681 (2006).
281. Brief for the United States, supra note 124, at 24.
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formal apologies to foreign governments if a violation is confirmed; and




The executive branch exercises preventive power primarily through
state and federal agencies, which conduct educational and training pro-
grams to prevent the recurrence of Article 36 violations. Recent efforts
by the State Department and other agencies appear increasingly effective
in preventing Article 36 violations at the federal, state, and local levels,
but this success is a recent development. Early efforts by the State De-
partment to educate law enforcement about the VCCR served only to
demonstrate how little the diplomatic and consular community knew
about communicating with law enforcement and criminal justice agen-
cies in the United States. Communicating with the over 17,800 local,
state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies is a daunting task
due to the lack of any central authority or common communications sys-
tem. 2" As one commentator has noted, "[i]ntroducing simple reforms
into a complex system is extremely difficult. This has long been true in
the realm of criminal justice." '285 Even within a single state, most local
law enforcement agencies operate independently of each other and state
286 igovernment, and it is difficult to communicate significant changes in
law or policy.
211
282. Id. at 24-25.
283. Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of State and Local Law Enforce-
ment Agencies, 2000, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (Oct. 2002) (17,784
state and local law enforcement agencies surveyed); Brian A. Reaves & Timothy Hart, Federal
Law Enforcement Officers, 2000, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 1 (July 2001)
(sixty-nine federal law enforcement agencies surveyed); Matthew Hickman, Tribal Law En-
forcement, 2000, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS FACT SHEET 1 (Jan. 2003) (171 law
enforcement agencies surveyed).
284. Daniel J. Freed, The Nonsystem of Criminal Justice, in LAW AND ORDER RECON-
SIDERED: A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE 263, 266-67 (James S. Campbell, Joseph R. Sahid & David P. Stang eds., 1969).
285. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687 (1992).
286. See Mary Clifford, The Criminal Justice System in the United States: General
Overview, in COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: POLICING,
JUDICIARY AND CORRECTIONS 11, 17-18 (Obi N. Ignatius Ebbe ed., 1996); V.A. LEONARD &
HENRY N. MORE, THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 103 (1967); David
Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 90 (2006) ("[L]aw
enforcement often seems to operate outside of the normal processes of local government,
accountable to no one."). See also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997).
287. Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: the U.S. Justice De-
partment "Pattern or Practice" Suits in Context, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 18 n.84
(2003) ("[F]ederal courts have no ability to ensure that all officers are even informed of im-
portant new decisions."). See also STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE
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Shortly after the United States ratified the VCCR, the State De-
partment advised state governors that "[w]e do not believe that the
Vienna Convention will require significant departures from existing
practice within the several states of the United States. 28 Between 1970
and 1997, the Department's effort to educate law enforcement about
Article 36 was limited to a two-page letter mailed occasionally to state
attorneys general, governors, and the mayors of large cities.8 9 This
memorandum "remind[ed] ... law enforcement personnel that, when-
ever they arrest or otherwise detain a foreign national in the United
States, there may be a legal obligation to notify diplomatic or consular
representatives of that person's government in this country.' 29° Absent
from the 1993 memorandum was any indication that the requirement
for consular notification stemmed from a treaty which, under the Su-
premacy Clause, imposed binding obligations on state and local law
enforcement.9 With the exception of training programs held in Los
SUPREME COURT 4-14 (1976); Albert. T. Goodwin, How the Supreme Court Employs Inferior
Courts as Messengers, 75 OR. L. REV. 699, 701 (1996); Bradley C. Canon, Studying Agency
Implementation of Judicial Policies: A Heuristic Model 8 (annual meeting of the Midwest
Political Sci. Ass'n, Chicago, II., Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.allacademic.com.
288. U.S. Dep't of State, Answers to the Questions Posed by the First Circuit in United
States v. Nai Fook Li at A-9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7111 .doc (quoting
an April 1970 letter from John R. Stevenson, State Department Legal Adviser, to the governors
of the states). It must be noted that that while this Article focuses on Article 36 as it applies
within the criminal justice system, consular notification under Articles 36 and 37 of the VCCR
also applies to other situations where governments assume custody or control of foreign chil-
dren and dependent adults (including through guardianship or trusteeship), due to deaths of
foreign nationals in plane crashes and shipwrecks. See Pamela Kemp Parker, When a Foreign
Child Comes Into Care: Has the Consul Been Notified?, 19 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 177
(2001).
289. William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 274-275 (1998); See also
Declaration of Ambassador Maura A. Harty Regarding United States Compliance with Article
36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, at 4-6, attachment to Counter-
Memorial of the U.S., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Harty Declaration].
290. U.S. Dep't of State, Notice for Law Enforcement Officials on Detention of Foreign
Nationals (April 20, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1993 Notice]. The text of the
1993 Notice covers two typewritten pages and was similar to memoranda sent in 1986 and
1991. An Annex to the 1993 Notice contained phone numbers for foreign embassies and con-
sulates. See also Aceves, supra note 289, at 275; Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An
Argument Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 47 UCLA L. REv. 307, 332 (1999).
291. Also absent from the memo was the text of Article 36 or even a citation to the
treaty. As Aceves noted, "the State Department notice itself [was] not binding upon state or
local officials'" Aceves, supra note 289, at 275. Whether inclusion of a citation to the treaty
would have helped emphasize the legal requirements imposed by Article 36 is questionable,
since at the time few law enforcement agencies had access to, let alone copies of, United
States Treaties & International Agreements (U.S.T.), the official compilation of treaties to
which the United States is a party. Although U.S.T. is comparable to the United States Code, it
was highly unusual to find copies of it outside of major law libraries. Lack of access to
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Angeles and Atlanta prior to the 1984 and 1996 Olympics, 2 92 law en-
forcement training on the VCCR by the Office of the Legal Adviser at
the State Department appears to have focused on law enforcement
agencies in and around Washington, D.C., and New York City.
Beginning in 1997, the State Department significantly expanded its
efforts to inform state and local law enforcement about Article 36.293
The Office of the Legal Adviser, in response to Paraguay's application
in the ICJ294 and increasing pressure from foreign governments295 un-
dertook a detailed examination of State Department practices and
initiated a new outreach program.29 In 2001, based on the recommen-
dations from the Legal Adviser, the Secretary of State agreed to expand
the outreach program on the VCCR. Responsibility for VCCR training
was located in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and a career consular
officer was assigned to head an Office of Consular Notification (OCN)
within the Bureau. 97 Since 2001, the OCN has conducted over 400
298training sessions. In addition, it has distributed over 145,000 copies
of its publication, Consular Notification and Access,199 as well as
adequate legal materials by law enforcement has been a persistent problem that has been
documented since the 1970s. WASBY, supra note 287, at 35; Goodwin, supra note 287, at 701.
292. The primary emphasis of the training, which was held on November 14-15, 1995,
in Atlanta, was on diplomatic and consular immunity (see VCCR supra note 1, arts. 31-35,
40-45, 59, 61, 63) rather than on arrests of foreign nationals. However, one hour of the pro-
gram was devoted to Article 36 procedures. See Memorandum from Bob Keller, Prosecution
Planning Group for the 1996 Olympics, to All Metro Atlanta Prosecuting Attorneys, Diplo-
matic & Consular Immunity Training (Nov. 8, 1995) (on file with authors); Memorandum
from Molly Johnson Halle, FBI Atlanta, to Criminal Justice Task Force, Diplomatic Immunity
Training (Nov. 2, 1995) (on file with authors).
293. Sam Howe Verhovek, U.S. Renews Campaign to Safeguard Rights of Foreign Citi-
zens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, § 1, at 27. See also Harty Declaration, supra note 289, at 7.
294. See Application of the Republic of Paraguay, Case Concerning the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 2000 I.C.J. Pleadings 3 (April 3, 1998).
295. Harty Declaration, supra note 289, at 5-6.
296. E-mail messages from M. Elizabeth Swope, Senior Adviser, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, Dep't of State (July 26, 2006) (on file with authors).
297. M. Elizabeth Swope was designated as Senior Coordinator for Consular Notifica-
tion within the Office of the Legal Adviser in 1998 and remained in that position until 2001.
Secretary of State Albright transferred the functions to the Office of Public Affairs and Policy
Coordination in the Bureau of Consular Affairs "where it acquired a real staff." Id.
298. E-mail message from James A. Lawrence, Public Affairs Specialist, Bureau of Con-
sular Affairs at the U.S. Dep't of State (Aug 10, 2006) (on file with authors). Career State
Department officers believe that the actual number of training programs on the VCCR that
have been conducted by the Department of State since 2001 exceeds this figure by at least
threefold. While the Bureau of Consular Affairs assumed primary responsibility for VCCR
training, personnel from the Office of Legal Adviser, the Office of the Chief of Protocol, and
the Diplomatic Security Service also conducted training programs that included the notifica-
tion and access aspects of the VCCR.
299. See DoS BLUE BOOK, supra note 208.
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pocket cards,300 video tapes3°' and compact discs.30 2 Courts and commen-
tators have commended the Department's Article 36 efforts since 1998.303
State and local governments and law enforcement agencies have also
begun adopting meaningful policies and procedures that implement Arti-
cle 36 requirements. These state actions may have been motivated as
much by litigation over Article 36 as by the State Department's increased
outreach efforts. Georgia, building on the work done for the 1996 Olym-
pics, published model procedures for the arrest of foreign nationals that
implemented Article 36 requirements3°4 and incorporated consular notifi-
cation into the state curriculum for new law enforcement officers and jailS 305
booking procedures. Other law enforcement agencies adopted internal
procedures implementing Article 3630' or added consular notification to
existing training requirements for officers.3 7 In Texas, magistrates were
charged with ensuring that arrested foreign nationals were informed of
their rights under Article 36 at arraignment. In 1992, the American
Correctional Association adopted a standard that requires accredited jails
and prisons to have a written policy and practice to provide foreign na-
tionals access to the diplomatic representative of their country of
300. See U.S. Dep't of State, Consular Notification and Access Reference Card: Instruc-
tions for Arrests and Detentions of Foreign Nationals (2004).
301. Video Tape: It's the Right Thing to Do (U.S. Dep't of State 1998).
302. CD-ROM: Consular Notification and Access (U.S. Dep't of State 2006).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 74 (1st Cir. 2000); Colter Paul-
son, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since 1987, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 444 (2004).
304. GA. DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, A MODEL LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
MANUAL Ch. 8-1 (6th ed., 1996), available at http://www.dca.state.ga.us/development/
research/programs/downloads/law/Chap8-1.html. This was also cited by Mexico in Memorial
of Mexico, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) at n.209,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus-ipleadings-200
30620_memorial_04.pdf.
305. Effective July 1, 2007, Georgia law requires that "[wIhen any person charged with a
felony or with driving under the influence ... is confined, for any period .... a reasonable
effort shall be made to determine the nationality of the person so confined." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-4-14(a) (2006).
306. See, e.g., N.Y POLICE DEP'T, N.Y.P.D. PATROL MANUAL, Procedure No. 208-56
(effective Feb. 28, 2001) cited in Memorial of Mexico, supra note 304, n.209.
307. For example, Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma now include consular notification and access in the basic training curriculum for all
police officers. In Pennsylvania, it has been added to the annual in-service training require-
ments for municipal police officers. James A. Lawrence, Office of Consular Notification,
Update to Appendix 3, State Compliance Initiatives (Aug. 10, 2006) (originally submitted as
an appendix to the Harty Declaration, supra note 289).
308. John Comyn, Attorney General of Texas, MAGISTRATE'S GUIDE TO THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON CONSULAR NOTIFICATIONS, Tab 1 (2000); Harty Declaration supra note 289,
app. 3 at 5.
Summer 2006] 1227
Michigan Journal of International Law
citizenship.3°9 Of even greater impact on law enforcement practices is the
adoption of a consular notification and access standard by the Commis-
sion on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) on
November 18, 2005.3
Federal agencies also have adopted internal procedures that require
consular notification.31' For example, both the Department of Justice and
the Department of Homeland Security have issued regulations that imple-
ment the requirements of Article 36. However, those regulations differ
considerably. The Justice Department regulationst 2 split the responsibili-
ties for consular notification between the arresting officer31 3 and the United
States Attorneys . In contrast, the Department of Homeland Security
regulations only apply to immigration cases13 and place complete respon-
sibility for notification on the arresting officer. Federal agencies have
also published articles"7 and provided training on consular notification.
Although preventive efforts by executive agencies may not lead to
perfect Article 36 compliance, these efforts have contributed to an over-
all reduction in the number of Article 36 violations. In recent years, the
number of complaints from consular officials that relate to Article 36 has
decreased dramatically in many jurisdictions.3 "' A small number of con-
sulates have even expressed concern that they are receiving more
detention notifications than they can handle.1 9 These substantial im-
provements over a short period of time suggest preventive efforts are, to
some degree, an effective means of enforcing Article 36.
309. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL
DETENTION FACILITIES (3d ed. 1991). See also, U.S. Dep't St., Consular Notification and
Access Standard Operating Procedure (2006), http://travel.state.gov.model-operating-proced
ure.doc (citing to the ACA standard).
310. Standard 1.1.4 requires accredited law enforcement agencies to have "[a] written
directive [that] governs procedures for assuring compliance with all consular notification and
access requirements in accordance with international treaties when dealing with foreign na-
tionals." COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, STANDARDS FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (5th ed. 2006). All CALEA accredited law enforcement agen-
cies must be in compliance with the new standard by October 1, 2007.
311. See e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.4.12.9,
available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/irm/part9/ch04s 5.html.
312. 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2006).
313. Id. at (a)(1) ("[T]he arresting officer shall inform the foreign national that his con-
sul will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such notification to be given.").
314. Id. at (a)(3) ("The U.S. Attorney shall then notify the appropriate consul.. .
315. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2006).
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., M. Wesley Clark, Providing Consular Rights Warnings to Foreign Nation-
als, 71 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 22 (Mar. 2002).
318. Harty Declaration, supra note 289, at 13.
319. Id. at 14.
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b. Remedial Power
The extent of executive power to remedy past Article 36 violations
has not been statistically verified. In Avena, the United States argued to
the ICJ that executive enforcement is sufficient to give "full effect" to
Article 36 requirements. The ICJ rejected this claim and ordered judicial
"review and reconsideration" of the convictions of fifty-one Mexican
nationals by the United States. On February 28, 2005, President Bush, in
an ironic gesture, announced that the United States would enforce Avena
through "unilateral Executive Branch action."'320 The President issued a
memorandum stating that "the United States will discharge its interna-
tional obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice
in [Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accor-
dance with general principles of comity.' ' 32' Further, state "procedural
default rules may not prevent review and reconsideration for the [fifty-
one] individuals identified in Avena."
322
The memorandum was issued only two months after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke to determine whether the
Avena judgment required state courts to review the convictions at issue.
Pursuant to the memorandum, Medellin filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals only four days
before oral arguments in Medellin were to be heard by the Supreme
Court.
3 23 The Supreme Court determined that this state habeas proceed-
ing might provide Medellin with the review and reconsideration of his
Article 36 claim that he concurrently sought in the Supreme Court
proceeding.3 24 In light of the pending state court proceeding, and consid-
ering the "number of hurdles Medellin must surmount before qualifying
for federal habeas relief in this proceeding,"3'2 the Supreme Court dis-
missed Medellin's writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.326 The
Supreme Court remained "rightfully agnostic ' 327 as to the constitutional-
ity of the February 28 Memorandum, noting that "'in all likelihood'
[the] Court would be positioned 'to review the Texas courts' treatment of
the President's [M]emorandum and [the Avena judgment].' 
,13 2
320. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41, Medel-
lin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490.
321. Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005) reprinted in id. App. 2.
322. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note
320, at 48.
323. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 663-64.
324. Id. at 664.
325. Id. at 662.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 668 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 664 n. I (majority opinion)).
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will rule on the constitutional-
ity of the President's memorandum in Ex parte Medellin. The position of
the United States is that the memorandum was authorized by the Presi-
dent's "constitutionally based foreign affairs power, and his authority
under the United Nations Charter."329 The "presidential determination,
like an executive agreement, has independent legal force and effect, and
contrary state rules must give way under the Supremacy Clause."33 The
State of Texas contends that the memorandum does not provide a legal
basis for review of the procedurally defaulted claim,"' and that "the
President's 'independent authority to act' in foreign affairs [does not in-
clude] a unilateral power to preempt state law, based on a unilateral
assertion that the preemption serves the United States' foreign policy
interests.332
The ruling in this case and the appeals that follow will establish the
extent of the executive's authority to order judicial review of Article 36
claims. However, the President's memorandum only applies to the cases
of the fifty-one Mexican nationals covered in Avena, and the United
States' withdrawal from the Optional Protocol precludes similar ICJ rul-
ings in the future. Thus, if the executive has the authority to order
judicial review of Article 36 claims, it is unclear to what extent this au-
thority would be exercised.
Another option is to use executive clemency to grant pardons, com-
mutations, or reprieves from criminal convictions of foreign nationals
who have persuasive Article 36 claims.33 "Clemency is deeply rooted in
our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for pre-
venting miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been
exhausted. 334 Clemency is subject to minimal judicial oversight, and
may be used "to correct an unjust result in legal proceedings. 335 How-
ever, clemency is routinely denied in most capital cases and offers no
guarantee of relief for even the most egregious Article 36 violations. In
Avena, the ICJ concluded that clemency proceedings were not an ade-
quate means of redressing Article 36 violations. Noting the discretionary
nature of clemency proceedings, the ICJ found that executive clemency
329. Brief for the United States, supra note 320, at 9.
330. Id.
331. Brief of Respondent at 39-40, Ex parte Medellin, No. WR-50, 191-02 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
332. Id. at 39 (quoting American Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003)).
333. See Linda E. Carter, Lessons From Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judi-
cial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 259 (2005).
334. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,411-12 (1993).
335. Carter, supra note 333.
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did not guarantee relief for even the most prejudicial Article 36 viola-
336
tions and was not sufficiently reliable as a review of Article 36 claims.
The record on clemency petitions incorporating Article 36 claims
bears out the ICJ's concerns. So far, only one foreign national has been
granted clemency based on an Article 36 violation. Oklahoma Governor
Brad Henry commuted the death sentence of Osbaldo Torres to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, based in part on an Article 36
violation raised in his clemency petition.337 Although clemency remains
an option for foreign nationals who have exhausted other legal opportu-
nities, it will rarely be a basis for relief from Article 36 violations, and it
may only be available to remedy cases of grave injustice.
2. Legislative Channels
Under the Sanchez-Llamas majority's interpretation of Article 36(2),
any remedy for Article 36 violations must conform to "the laws and
regulations of the receiving State."'338 This gives federal and state law-
making bodies the ultimate power to decide whether and how to enforce
Article 36 requirements. It is likely that different legislative bodies will
exercise this power in different ways.
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court held that "a State may apply
its regular rules of procedural default to Article 36 claims. 339 While it is
possible that a state could enact legislation that would exempt Article 36
claims from the State's procedural default rules, or, in the alternative,
create other judicial remedies for Article 36 violations, no state has taken
such a step.
States generally have been hostile toward Article 36 enforcement. A
spokesman for Texas Governor Rick Perry has stated that "there is no
authority for the federal government [or the ICJ] to prohibit Texas from
exercising the laws passed by our legislature."' ° Former Virginia Gover-
nor James Gilmore argued that staying an execution based on a violation
of Article 36 "would have the practical effect of transferring responsibil-
ity from the courts of the commonwealth and the United States to the
International Court."34'
336. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12, 143 (Mar. 31).
337. Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
338. 126 S. Ct. at 2680 (2006).
339. Id. at 2674.
340. C. Bryson Hull, Texas Snubs World Court on Execution Stays, REUTERS, Feb. 11,
2003, http://www.rense.com/general143/exec.htm.
341. Paraguayan National Executed After Appeals Fail, CNN, Apr. 15, 1998,
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9804/15/paraguay.execution.onl.
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Legislatures in Florida 42 and Oregon43 have enacted statutes reflect-
ing these sentiments. Oregon's statute provides that noncompliance with
Article 36 notification requirements is not a basis for civil or criminal
liability, and that violation of Article 36 "does not in itself constitute
grounds for the exclusion of evidence that would otherwise be admissi-
ble in a proceeding." Florida's statute goes even further, stating that the
"failure to provide consular notification under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations or other bilateral consular conventions shall not be a
defense in any criminal proceeding against any foreign national and shall
not be cause for the foreign national's discharge from custody."345
Some members of Congress have also adopted a hostile attitude to-
wards Article 36 enforcement. Texas Senator John Comyn has expressly
disapproved of any suggestion that "our criminal laws and criminal poli-
cies are informed ... by the rulings of foreign courts. 36 Comyn also
authored an Amicus Brief in Medellin v. Dretke, arguing that
petitioner's argument, notwithstanding its impressive amicus
support, 'strain[s] the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of' by those who framed and ratified
it. The Framers carefully confined the immense power of judi-
cial review to Article III judges whose appointment requires the
dual action of the President and the Senate .... "
Senator Cornyn's arguments focus on the usurpation of Congress'
authority by international tribunals. The Supreme Court's rebuke of the
ICJ in Sanchez-Llamas may temper some legislative negativity towards
Article 36. Indeed, with the domestic-international conflict over the issue
subsiding, legislatures may be more willing to pass legislation aimed at
enforcing Article 36 requirements. Currently, California,-48 North Caro-
lina,349 and Oregon35° have enacted statutes codifying consular
notification requirements. Still, these statutes provide inconsistent levels
of protection, and none has gone so far as to impose a judicial remedy
for Article 36 violations.
342. FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (2006).
343. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.642, 426.234(l)(e), 426.228 (9)(a) (2006).
344. Id. §§ 426.28 (9)(b), 426.234(1)(e).
345. FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (2006).
346. S. Res 92, 109th Cong.'(2005) (statement of Sen. John Comyn upon submission of
the resolution).
347. Brief for Amicus Curiae Sen. John Cornyn in Support of Respondent at 4, Medellin
v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890)).
348. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c(a)(1), 5028(b) (West Supp. 2005).
349. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-344 (2003).
350. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.642, 426.234(1)(e), 426.228 (9)(a) (2006).
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California's statute currently offers the highest level of protection
and essentially codifies Article 36 requirements. The statute provides
that any peace officer detaining a foreign national for more than two
hours must give notice of consular assistance rights and follow State De-
partment procedures for compliance with notification requests. Training
manuals for California law enforcement agents must "incorporate lan-
guage based upon provisions of [Article 36] that set forth requirements
for handling the arrest and booking or detention for more than two hours
of a foreign national pursuant to this section."
35" ' Additionally, the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections is charged with notifying foreign
nationals of consular assistance rights, and, upon request, furnishing a
consulate "with a list of the names and locations of all inmates in its cus-
tody that have self-identified that nation as his or her place of birth.
352
Nonetheless, the California legislature did not provide a judicial remedy
for noncompliance with these requirements.
The Oregon and North Carolina statutes offer less protection. One
Oregon statute requires its Board on Public Safety Standards and Train-
ing to ensure that all police officers "understand the requirements of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and identify situations in
which the officers are required to inform a person of the person's rights
under the convention." '353 Another imposes a requirement for Article 36
notification, but only when a foreign national is detained for "care, cus-
tody or treatment for mental illness.""' North Carolina has a similar
statute governing consular notification when foreign nationals are invol-
untarily detained for mental health reasons, and requiring that the
governor notify consular officials of a foreign national's commitment.
35
These statutes do not provide a remedy for violations, and they include
inconsistent levels of protection for different foreign nationals.
Although the Sanchez-Llamas majority's interpretation of Article
36(2) gives lawmakers the ultimate power over Article 36 enforcement,
it is unclear how this power will be exercised. Legislatures, at their dis-
cretion, can enact laws that either help or hinder Article 36 enforcement,
as evidenced by existing statutes addressing Article 36.
C. Civil Remedies
Although Sanchez-Llamas does not address civil remedies for Arti-
cle 36 violations, the decision will affect the future success of such
351. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c(a)(3)(c) (West Supp. 2005).
352. Id. § 5028(b).
353. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (2006).
354. Id. § 426.228 (9)(a).
355. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-344 (2003).
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actions. Foreign nationals have sought civil relief for Article 36 viola-
tions in Section 1983 civil rights actions and in claims filed under the
Alien Tort Statute.
One such case is Jogi v. Voges. 356 In Jogi, the Seventh Circuit held
that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear civil actions
based on Article 36 violations filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS provides that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." '357 The plaintiff in Jogi served six years of a twelve-year sentence
for aggravated battery and was not notified of his Article 36 rights. Upon
release and deportation, he filed a pro se complaint under the ATS seek-
ing relief for the violation of his Article 36 rights.358
The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Jogi's com-
plaint, because the ATS applies only to "shockingly egregious violations
of universally recognized principles of international law,"359 and because
Jogi "failed to sufficiently plead a tort under the ATS."36 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, finding that Article 36 created an implied right of action
under the ATS. The court determined that "the drafters of the treaty in-
tended to make ... it privately enforceable. 3 6' As a result, where no
judicial remedy existed for an Article 36 violation in a criminal case, "a
damages action [was] the only avenue left" to give "full effect" to the
rights in Article 36.362 Although the Seventh Circuit did not find that an
Article 36 violation is a tort, the court determined that it was "something
along the lines of breach of duty to disclose in the context of special re-
lationship ' 363 and thus gave rise to a private right of action.
Sanchez-Llamas appears to support the district court's determination
that jurisdiction over Jogi's complaint was not proper under the ATS be-
cause Article 36 does not convey a privately enforceable right. The ATS
grants jurisdiction "for a tort only." The VCCR does not state that an Ar-
ticle 36 violation constitutes a tort or should be remedied in a manner
similar to a tort. In finding an implied right of action under Article 36,
the Seventh Circuit in Jogi relied on the same argument that the Sanchez-
Llamas dissent used to argue in favor of a suppression remedy. The
Sanchez-Llamas majority expressly rejected this interpretation of the
356. 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005).
357. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005).
358. 425 F.3d at 370.
359. Id. at 371.
360. Id.; see also Jogi v. Piland, 131 F Supp. 2d. 1024, 1027 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
361. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
362. Id. at 385.
363. Id.
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Article 36(2) "full effect" requirement. Thus, it is unlikely after Sanchez-
Llamas that an Article 36 violation can be remedied through a civil ac-
tion filed under the ATS.
Sanchez-Llamas may have implications for section 1983 claims as
well. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "imposes liability on anyone who, under color of
state law, deprives a person 'of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States."
36 Courts are
divided as to whether an Article 36 violation can sustain a claim for civil
damages under Section 1983. In Sorensen v. City of New York, the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York found that monetary
damages under Section 1983 were not available as a remedy for Article
36 violations.3 6 ' The Court denied relief on the basis that "the Vienna
Convention, by its terms, does not require that such violation be re-
dressed by money damages. ' 366 Further, according to the court, no other
country "imposes civil liability upon its municipalities for violation of
Article 36.',367 However, the court in Standt v. City of New York reached a
contrary conclusion, holding that Section 1983 damages are authorized
by the provision in Article 36(2) that consular notification be "exercised
in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.""
3
Sanchez-Llamas appears to support the determination in Standt that
civil damages under Section 1983 are available for Article 36 violations.
Section 1983 liability results when a person is deprived of "any rights
•.. secured by the laws of the United States. 369 The VCCR is a law of
the United States by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and assuming that
Article 36 creates individual rights, there is no reason why an Article 36
violation could not be the basis for a Section 1983 action. It is irrelevant
that the VCCR does not authorize this relief, because the liability arises
under "the laws and regulations of the receiving State."
Remedies must be carefully chosen, however. The Supreme Court
ruled in Heck v. Humphrey that if a civil "judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence
... the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
' 370 In Diaz v.
Van Norman, the district court held that Heck barred a Section 1983 ac-
tion based on Article 36 because the action challenged the
364. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
365. 2000 WL 1528282 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
366. Id. at 6.
367. Id. at 7.
368. 153 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
369. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
370. 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994).
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"circumstances underlying [the plaintiff's] continued confinement. 37'
Most recently, in DeLos Santos-Mora v. Bradenham, the Fourth Circuit
held that a plaintiff's ATS claim based on an Article 36 violation was not
barred by Heck, on the ground that "[Sanchez-Llamas] noted that Article
36 ... does not implicate any right to consular intervention or cessation
of the criminal investigation and that violation of any rights under Arti-
cle 36 would not trigger application of the exclusionary rule. 372
The difficulties associated with claims under the ATS and Section
1983-along with the conflict between civil remedies and existing
criminal prosecutions-suggest that civil litigation of Article 36 claims
faces significant jurisprudential hurdles.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 36 of the VCCR Treaty serves as a safeguard to ensure
that foreign nationals arrested in another country are afforded
the right to contact their consulate so that both can develop a
meaningful dialogue to protect the foreign national from the cul-
tural barriers and chaos which often surrounds detention for
alleged criminal activity. Detained foreign nationals are inevita-
bly distressed by the prospect of securing and preserving their
rights in a legal system with whose institutions and rules they
are not familiar.373
Manipulation of a detained national by federal and local authorities374
may interfere with the detainee's understanding and invocation of fun-
damental rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.373
The Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon for the first time
decided certain substantive issues relating to Article 36. The Court's rul-
ings on these complex issues leave significant questions unanswered.
The Court, like many federal circuit and state courts, refused to rule on
whether Article 36 provides foreign nationals with enforceable individ-
ual rights. The Court also stood fast on the position that Article 36 does
not trump federal or state court procedural default rules. Yet, the Court
did find that Article 36 violations may affect the voluntariness of the
confessions or statements of foreign nationals.
371. 351 F Supp. 2d 679, 682 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
372. 2006 WL 2326964 (4th Cir. 2006).
373. LEE, supra note 8, at 145 (quoting U.S. Dep't of State, Telegram 40298 to Embassy
Damascus, Feb. 21, 1975).
374. Brief of the NACDL, supra note 9, at 8.
375. Kadish, supra note 14, at 605.
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On the other hand, the dissent took the strong position that Article 36
provides enforceable individual rights, which would permit foreign na-
tionals to raise an array of fundamental issues beyond that of
voluntariness. The dissent also disagreed with the majority on the critical
procedural default issue, stating that the majority's position is inconsis-
tent with a reasoned historical interpretation of the purpose of the
VCCR, which was to protect the detained foreign national from denial of
the right of consular access.
This Article has attempted to grapple with many of the questions that
remain unanswered in the Sanchez-Llamas majority opinion. Political
and civil remedies will not solve the multitude of problems that can arise
when a foreign national is arrested in the United States. Various judicial
remedies remain available for addressing these problems. The Supreme
Court, in its holding on the voluntariness issue, has opened the door
wide to myriad other analogous issues surrounding Article 36 of the
VCCR. Sanchez-Llamas will undoubtedly be the first in a long line of
cases which will be subject to Supreme Court scrutiny in the years to
come.
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